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FICTIONAL PLEAS
THEA JOHNSON*
A fictional plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty to a crime he has not
committed, with the knowledge of the defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge. With
fictional pleas, the plea of conviction is detached from the original factual
allegations against the defendant. As criminal justice actors become increasingly
troubled by the impact of collateral consequences on defendants, the fictional plea
serves as an appealing response to this concern. It allows the parties to achieve
parallel aims: the prosecutor holds the defendant accountable in the criminal system,
while the defendant avoids devastating noncriminal consequences. In this context,
the fictional plea is an offshoot of the “creative plea bargaining” encouraged by
Justice Stevens in Padilla v. Kentucky. Indeed, where there is no creative option
based on the underlying facts of an allegation, attorneys must turn to fiction.
The first part of this Article is descriptive, exploring how and why actors in the
criminal justice system—including defendants, prosecutors, and judges—use the
fictional plea for the purposes of avoiding collateral consequences. This Article
proposes that in any individual case, a fictional plea may embody a fair and just
result—the ability of a defendant to escape severe collateral consequences and a
prosecutor to negotiate a plea with empathy.
But this Article is also an examination of how this seemingly empathetic practice
is made possible by the nature of the modern adversarial process in which everything
is a bargaining chip. What does it mean that all parties in the criminal justice system
agree to allow a lie to become fact? What does the fictional plea tell us about the
role of truth in our adversarial structure? Faced with the moral quandary of
mandatory collateral consequences, the system adjusts by discarding truth and
focuses solely on resolution. In this sense, fictional pleas serve as a case study in
criminal justice problem solving. The fictional plea lays bare the soul of an
institution where everything has become a bargaining chip: not merely collateral
consequences, but truth itself. Rather than a grounding principle, truth is nothing
more than another factor to negotiate around.
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INTRODUCTION
A teenage defendant faces a felony charge for a single instance of unlawful sexual
contact with a minor.1 If convicted, he would be on the sex offender registry for the
rest of his life. The defendant is young and without a criminal record. His defense
attorney wants to make sure that his record remains clear and that he avoids sex
offender registration. There are many reasons the defense attorney wants to avoid
registration, but the most important one is that being on the sex offender registry will
exclude the defendant from shelters, group homes, and public housing. The
defendant, already struggling to find a place to live, will be totally without options if
he ends up with a registrable offense. Sex offender registration is the Russian doll of
collateral consequences—consequences are nested inside of other consequences.
The prosecutor is sympathetic to these concerns, but she wants to make sure that
the defendant faces some real penalties within the criminal system. This is a serious
charge with a victim involved. She also wants to make sure that the defendant is
monitored in some way by probation. According to the prosecutor, probation can
likely link the defendant to services and help him get on his feet.
The prosecutor and defense attorney—both repeat players in the criminal system,
who have worked on many cases together beyond this one—sit down to figure out a
solution. The solution will take the form of a negotiated plea bargain—one that,
hopefully, avoids a felony record and sex offender registration for the defendant,
while imposing meaningful sanctions that satisfy the prosecutor’s goals.
They begin by working backwards. What crimes can the defendant plead guilty
to without ending up on the sex offender registry? Nearly all the sex crimes in their
state are registrable offenses. They contemplate a plea to assault, but the prosecutor

1. The story told in the Introduction is based on the author’s interview with a defense
attorney. The interviewee was promised anonymity. Because of this, I will not identify the
interviewee by name or location.
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blanches at the “fiction” of claiming that the victim suffered “bodily injury,” which
is one of the statutorily required elements of the offense.
They return to the sex offenses. There is a small subset of misdemeanor sex
offenses—under the category of unlawful sexual touching—which are formally sex
offenses but do not carry any registration requirements. But misdemeanors are
punishable only up to a year. To the prosecutor, this hardly seems like sufficient
punishment for the crime, nor will it provide the necessary motivation to the
defendant to get help for his problems.
But what about several misdemeanor convictions, which would run consecutively?
Under this resolution, the defendant would avoid a felony record and lifetime sex
offender registration. The prosecutor would extract a significant sentence, involving
monitoring by probation. The problem is that there is only one allegation of sexual
misconduct involving the defendant and the victim. Separate misdemeanor pleas
would involve an admission of guilt to separate factual allegations. This, however, is
a “fiction” that both parties can tolerate.
They agree that the defendant will plead to three misdemeanors. Because these
are misdemeanors, which have laxer procedural requirements, there is no local rule
of criminal procedure that obligates the parties to put a recitation of the factual basis
for the plea into the record. Although the judge looks at the deal with some suspicion,
he allows the plea to move forward. The defendant pleads guilty to three counts of a
misdemeanor sex offense.
The defendant has entered a fictional plea—a plea bargain agreement in which
the defendant pleads guilty to a crime he did not commit, with the consent and
knowledge of multiple actors in the criminal justice system—to avoid the profound
collateral consequences that would flow from a conviction on his initial charge. In
courtrooms across the country, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are
allowing plea bargains to charges of conviction, which are completely disconnected
from any factual allegations against the defendant. Such pleas are not new. Indeed,
they have long been used to avoid strict criminal penalties associated with a particular
charge.2 But in the “era of collateral consequences,”3 these fictional pleas have found
new life.
This is the contrast presented here: descriptively, this Article tells the story of
individuals—individual prosecutors, defendants, defense attorneys, and judges
—who are carefully tailoring decisions to meet the needs of parties in a particular
case. But those individual stories explain something important about how the
criminal justice system—as an institution—responds to this mass of cases. Although
individual defendants may benefit profoundly from the use of a fictional plea, the
fictional plea represents the distillation of a system that has become untethered from
ideas of accuracy and truthfulness. The use of fictional pleas asks us to confront
difficult questions about truth, prosecutorial power, and the legitimacy of the
criminal system.

2. See infra Section I.A.
3. Thea Johnson, Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain, 92 IND. L.J. 901, 905–908 (2017)
(describing this moment as an “era of collateral consequences,” not because collateral
consequences are a new phenomenon but because lawyers, judges, legislatures, and the public
have become increasingly aware of the impact of such consequences).
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But first, what gives the fictional plea new life at this moment? This Article
proposes that such pleas provide defendants and prosecutors an opportunity to meet
parallel aims that often cannot be achieved without their use. As the scope of
collateral consequences expands,4 it becomes more difficult to negotiate around such
consequences in any given case. There are many criminal cases in which the factual
allegations against the defendant only support a single charge or a small universe of
charges, which may all carry serious collateral consequences. For instance, most drug
offenses are deportable offenses,5 and nearly all sex crimes now carry sex offender
registration requirements.6 In such cases, the range of disposition options based on
the facts of the case is limited. The fictional plea can help expand that range to
include more potential resolutions that satisfy the needs of all parties to the
negotiation. Specifically, fictional pleas allow prosecutors to hold defendants
accountable in the criminal system, while not dooming those same defendants to the
devastating collateral consequences that flow from many criminal convictions.
The criminal system has become the first, and often only, place where there is any
opportunity for individuals to avoid many of the subsequent, noncriminal sanctions
that now attach to convictions. Immigration consequences provide the clearest
example. The criminal courts are, as Stephen Lee notes, “de facto immigration
courts.”7 Once a defendant has committed a deportable offense in the criminal system,
there are very few ways to escape deportation in the immigration system. 8 The
criminal system thus becomes the primary space for the noncitizen defendant to
attempt to escape deportation. Much of that work is done through the fictional plea.
Fictional pleas—through minor sleights of hand or outright manipulation of facts
or law—avoid deportation and other collateral consequences, while allowing the
prosecutor to secure a disposition in the criminal case. In this sense, they are an
offshoot of the “creative plea bargaining” encouraged by Justice Stevens in Padilla
v. Kentucky.9 Such creative bargaining, which involves negotiating around collateral
consequences, is common among the players in the criminal system. 10 Parties often
use creative bargaining when the field of plea options based on the facts of the case
are limited. Sometimes there are no options available based on the underlying facts
of the allegation. In these cases, the attorneys must turn to fiction. This turn to fiction
leads to a certain level of collusion among prosecutors and defense attorneys, and
even judges, who accept pleas on the record that are unsupported by the factual
allegations.
But, as this Article proposes, although fictional pleas can be helpful for individual
defendants, and even for judges or prosecutors, who are concerned about the creeping

4. For a state-by-state guide to potential collateral consequences, see National Inventory
of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. GOV’T JUST. CTR., https://
niccc.csgjusticecenter.org [https://perma.cc/9RGT-JA4P].
5. See infra Section I.C.2.
6. See infra Section I.C.3.
7. Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553 (2013).
8. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 671–80
(2015) (discussing the “unforgiving” nature of U.S. immigration law).
9. 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010).
10. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1772–75 (2013); see also Johnson, supra note 3, at 119–22.
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reach of noncriminal consequences into the realm of criminal law, the fictional plea
as a trend symbolizes the criminal justice system’s abandonment of truth seeking as
a function.
This is the paradox. In individual cases, the fictional plea represents a legitimate
response to the criminal system’s encroachment into other areas of the law, and the
role of the prosecutor as “gatekeeper”11 to the immigration system, as well as the
systems that regulate public housing, student aid, and public benefits. A fictional plea
can save a defendant from being deported from the country, losing his job, or
becoming a lifetime sex offender. And yet, as a trend within the criminal system, the
fictional plea exemplifies what Julia Simon-Kerr has termed “systemic lying,”
coordinated lying among many actors in the criminal justice system when there is a
“strong and collective dissonance between moral beliefs and legal prescriptions.” 12
Fictional pleas function in this dissonant space.
Fictional pleas have become a necessary protection not only for defendants but
also for those prosecutors who resist using criminal law as an enforcement arm in
noncriminal arenas. Legislatures have created circumstances in which prosecutors
feel compelled to assist defendants in securing “safe” pleas. These deals, like most
plea bargains, occur under the radar. But increasingly district attorneys are
proclaiming their resistance to punishing defendants twice—once for the criminal
case, and another time by collateral consequence. Prosecutors are using their
discretion to protect certain defendants as a form of protest against what many see as
an unfair discrepancy between the penalties imposed on noncitizens versus citizens13
and on defendants who will be crippled by noncriminal sanctions.
Part I of this Article describes the fictional plea in practice. In Section I.A, the
Article explores the varied uses of fictions in plea bargaining and then defines the
specific forms of the fictional plea in the context of collateral consequences. Each
subsection of Section I.B then discusses how each party to the plea bargain
—defendants, prosecutors, and judges—uses and benefits from the fictional plea. In
particular, this Section focuses on the use of fictional pleas by a new sort of
progressive district attorney emerging through the country, one who is open to
seeking “immigration-safe” pleas for defendants. Section I.C explains how fictional
pleas function as a safety valve in three types of cases: misdemeanors, drug cases,
and sex offenses. For each, the Article explores why and how the fictional plea has
taken hold and what it achieves for the defendant charged in these sorts of cases. Part
II turns away from description of the practice and argues that the development of the

11. Lee, supra note 7, at 553 (describing prosecutors as the “gatekeepers” to the
immigration courts).
12. Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2179 (2015).
13. See infra Section I.B.2; see also Corinne Ramey, Some Prosecutors Offer Plea Deals
to Avoid Deportation of Noncitizens, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2017, 9:53 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-prosecutors-offer-plea-deals-to-avoid-deportation-ofnoncitizens-1499419802 [https://perma.cc/SVP5-WNQW] (noting that Cyrus Vance, District
Attorney for Manhattan, justified his new Collateral Consequences Counsel position by
proclaiming “I submit today that if two New Yorkers commit the same low-level violation,
and the practical consequences for one of the New Yorkers is a ticket or a couple of days in
jail, while the consequences for the other New Yorker is to be taken away from her family and
shipped off to a foreign country, that is not equal justice under the law”).
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fictional plea in response to mandatory collateral consequences is the natural end
point of a system that has become untethered from its truth-seeking function. Section
II.B also explores what these present fictions mean for the future “truths” they
create—namely, the creation of a record of conviction—and argues that in avoiding
one set of collateral consequences, the parties unwittingly put into play a new set of
consequences that may have a similar or worse impact on the defendant. The Article
concludes by offering some thoughts on alternative responses—beyond the fictional
plea—to the injustices levied by mandatory collateral consequences.
I. FICTIONAL PLEAS IN PRACTICE
A. History and Terminology
To define fictional pleas, this Article borrows a definition from a critic of the
practice. A fictional plea is:
a guilty plea, a factual admission of the elements of a crime . . . an
‘admission of guilt for the purposes of the case,’ entered by a defendant
for an offense that the defendant did not commit, and that all the parties
in the case know the defendant did not commit.14
Fictional pleas involve fictions of both fact and law. Most fictional pleas require
the parties to manipulate or disregard altogether the facts underlying the
allegations—this Article refers to these sorts of fictional pleas as “factual fictions.”
They start with a factual premise—usually a criminal complaint that is based on
police reports, conversations with witnesses, and other evidence of the crime—and
they end with a plea that has little to no relation to that initial complaint. In this way,
they require the parties to abandon the alleged facts as they search for a resolution to
the case.15 Other types of fictional pleas involve the creation of dispositions that do

14. This was the definition that Mari Byrne gave to the term “baseless pleas” in her article,
Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2966 (2010) (footnotes
omitted) (citation omitted). Although this Article rejects the term “baseless pleas” in favor of
“fictional pleas,” the underlying definition provided by Byrne captures the core of the fictional
plea: an agreement by all parties that the defendant will plead to a crime he did not commit.
Byrne also uses the term “fictional plea” in her article but defines it instead as “a situation in
which a defendant is allowed to plead guilty to a crime that does not exist by criminal statute.”
Id. at 2967 (footnote omitted). In this Article, such pleas are defined as fictions of law. See
infra Section I.A.2.
15. It is important to note that this sort of abandonment of the facts is not limited to
fictional pleas. Indeed, one sees attorneys ignoring or covering up facts to achieve a particular
end, even before the Supreme Court. As Dale Carpenter lays out in his book Flagrant Conduct,
the real story behind the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas was quite different than the story
told by the advocates at the Supreme Court. In fighting against anti-sodomy laws, the lawyers
for the petitioners wove a tale of two men in love, sharing a moment of sexual intimacy, which
had been interrupted by the state. But as Carpenter discovered, the initial arrest that led to
Lawrence involved neither love nor sex, but two men who were arrested after a night of
drinking and fighting in a small Texas apartment. Fictions surface in the legal system, then, in
ways both big and small. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE
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not actually exist in the law, what this Article refers to as “fictions of law.” 16 These
are distinguished from legal fictions, which are operational across the law. Fictions
of law serve a one-time purpose: to transform a crime that would carry collateral
consequences into one that will not for this defendant, at this moment. Even if
fictions of law are used for more than one defendant, they are not transformed into a
formal legal fiction.
Examples of each of these types of fictional pleas will be developed in Section
I.A.2 below, but to give these bargains context, it is important to understand the
antecedents of the practice.
1. A Brief Review of Fictions in Plea Bargaining
Fictional pleas are not an invention of the era of collateral consequences, but they
are being used in innovative ways to combat the growing reach of collateral
consequences. There is both a history and critique of the use of fictions in plea
bargaining that began before the increasing awareness of collateral consequences.
There is an argument that plea bargaining itself is a type of fiction. Defendants
are often asked at the time they plead guilty to affirm that they were not promised
anything in exchange for their plea, even when the plea bargain often is a promise of
benefits without which the defendant would not agree to plead.17 In addition, when
an innocent person pleads guilty to a crime he did not commit, that plea can rightly
be viewed as a fiction. 18 Indeed, Josh Bowers contends that the criminal justice
system should categorize the “false plea[]” of an innocent person who nonetheless
pleads guilty to a crime as a legal fiction, allowing innocent defendants, like guilty
defendants, to make the choice to plead guilty in order to secure the benefits of a
plea. 19 Others have argued that plea bargaining in the shadow of mandatory
minimums has created an environment in which innocent people regularly plead
guilty to crimes they did not commit to avoid the risk of disproportionately long
sentences that are required after trial under a mandatory sentencing scheme. 20
Additionally, many defense advocates condemn prosecutors’ rampant use of lowlevel violations as a catchall to secure false convictions in weak cases. These
violations are seen as a sort of fiction—an easy label to attach to a broad and diverse
variety of conduct. In New York, for instance, there has been a long-standing critique
of the overuse of pleas to disorderly conduct, a noncriminal violation.21 Although the

V. TEXAS

(2012).
16. See infra Section I.A.2.
17. Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1170 (2008).
18. Id. at 1171–73; see also Anna Roberts, Conviction by Prior Impeachment, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 1977, 1993–94 (2016) (arguing that “it cannot be taken as a given that a conviction
correlates to the commission of a crime” and for that reason it is wrong-headed that witnesses
in trials are allowed to be impeached by evidence of prior convictions).
19. Id. at 1170.
20. E.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of
the Justice System, 61 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 63, 75–77 (2011); see also Jed. S. Rakoff, Why
Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks
.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty [https://perma.cc/8UN3-SNWR].
21. Steven Zeidman, Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 2008, at 2.
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disorderly conduct statute covers a range of behaviors, from taking up too much room
on the sidewalk to being “unreasonably” loud,22 it is used as a one-size-fits-all sack
for any number of cases to be stuffed into. For example, disorderly conduct is a
common plea resolution in cases such as shoplifting and turnstile jumping. 23
Some might also see echoes of the fictional plea in the process of “fact bargaining,”
which allows prosecutors to manipulate the relevant facts of a case to avoid
mandatory minimum sentences in a particular case. 24 This practice is typical in
federal drug cases where mandatory minimums are triggered by the allegation of
certain drug quantities in the indictment. 25 If the parties can agree to change the
quantity of drugs listed, they can also change the potential sentence. Of course, that
means allowing a defendant who was found with a large amount of cocaine to be
formally charged with possessing a much smaller amount. There is an argument that
this is not a direct falsehood—if a defendant possessed a hundred grams of cocaine,
surely one could say he also possessed ten grams of cocaine. But the practice
functions as a maneuver around the law, allowing the parties to tell only part of the

22. Disorderly conduct is defined in New York as follows:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:
1. He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or
2. He makes unreasonable noise; or
3. In a public place, he uses abusive or obscene language, or makes an obscene
gesture; or
4. Without lawful authority, he disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of
persons; or
5. He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic; or
6. He congregates with other persons in a public place and refuses to comply with
a lawful order of the police to disperse; or
7. He creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which
serves no legitimate purpose.
Disorderly conduct is a violation.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2017).
23. For instance, a local New York City lawyer and former Manhattan prosecutor, who
blogs for his law firm’s website, lists a disorderly conduct violation as a typical offer in a
shoplifting case involving more than $100 of goods but less than $500. Jeremy Saland,
Arrested for Shoplifting (New York Penal Law 155.25 or 165.40): Potential Offers or Deals
in Manhattan, CROTTY SALAND: N.Y. CRIM. LAW. BLOG (Oct. 24, 2010), https://
www.newyorkcriminallawyer-blog.com/2010/10/arrested-for-shoplifting-new-y.html
[https://perma.cc/RTM3-YUWK].
24. Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 87, 120 (2003).
25. This is made clear in a 2013 memo from Attorney General Eric Holder to Assistant
U.S. Attorneys that instructed them to decline to charge the quantity of drugs necessary to
trigger a mandatory minimum in certain cases where the defendant met a set of stringent
criteria. ERIC HOLDER, OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS AND ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION 2 (2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department
-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain
-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU7Z-Z5GL].

2019]

F I C TI ON A L P L E A S

863

full story of the case—the story of ten grams, rather than a hundred. But parties may
also swap in and out other facts—agreeing, for instance, to exclude from the formal
charges the gun found at the scene or to not find a defendant to be a recidivist, even
if he qualifies as one.26 Fact bargaining has been a regular practice for some time. A
study of federal probation officers in 1996 found that “approximately forty percent
of probation officers believe that [sentencing] guideline calculations set forth in plea
agreements in a majority of cases are not ‘supported by offense facts that accurately
and completely reflect all aspects of the case.’”27
Understanding the prior usage of fictions in plea bargaining provides some
context for the use of fictional pleas, indicating that the term can be read both
narrowly and broadly. This Article uses the definition given above—a defendant’s
plea of guilty to a crime that all parties agree he did not commit—to discuss this
practice.
2. Types of Fictional Pleas
This Article will focus on factual fictions. These are pleas in which the defendant
pleads guilty to a charge that is not supported by the factual allegations underlying
the arrest.28 The other category, which is found much less frequently, is what I call
fictions of law.29 These are cases where the defendant pleads guilty to a nonexistent

26. See, e.g., id. at 2–3 (directing Assistant United States Attorneys to decline to charge
the defendant as a recidivist in certain cases).
27. David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What
They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996).
28. This Article excludes from this category Alford pleas or pleas of nolo contendere,
which allow defendants to accept a guilty plea while either actively claiming innocence or not
admitting guilt. In these cases, even if the defendant contests his guilt, the initial factual
allegations generally support the charge. The Alford case itself demonstrates the point. The
Supreme Court upheld the plea in North Carolina v. Alford because the plea was made
knowingly and voluntarily and was supported by a strong factual basis. 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970);
see also People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 419–20 (Cal. 1970) (accepting a plea of nolo
contendere because “[t]he court may accept a bargained plea of guilty or nolo contendere to
any lesser offense reasonably related to the offense charged in the accusatory pleading”). In
addition, when a defendant enters into an Alford and nolo contendere plea, such an agreement
is clear from the record. As discussed in greater depth in Section II.B, fictional pleas create a
false record for future downstream actors. In this sense, Alford and nolo contendere pleas do
not fit within the narrow definition of fictional pleas. These pleas have, though, been critiqued
for their fictitious nature. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law
Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 1361 (2003) (arguing that these pleas undermine legal values and community norms);
Curtis J. Shipley, The Alford Plea: A Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal
Defendant, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1063 (1987).
29. There are many forms of fictions discussed in this Article. Yet another fiction recently
identified by Jessica S. Henry are convictions based on crimes that never occurred. Jessica S.
Henry, Smoke but No Fire: When Innocent People are Wrongly Convicted of Crimes That
Never Happened, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 665, 666 (2018) (finding that nearly one-third of
exonerations since 1989 involve no-crime convictions). Although this Article will not discuss
such fictions here, identifying the many fictional convictions in the criminal system gives
some sense of the scope of the issue.
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crime, meaning a crime that is not found in the statutes. I call these pleas fictions of
law rather than “legal fictions” to denote that they are different from formal legal
fictions, a commonly used device within the legal system.30 Fictions of law are likely
more rare because they are both easier for judges to spot and to object to than factual
fictions. Even so, fictions of law or pleas to nonexistent crimes can be found in the
case law.31
The line between factual fictions and fictions of law, however, is flexible. Even
given the elasticity of the terms, the definitions here provide a foothold for exploring
the nuances of the use of fictions in practice. Because factual fictions are more
common—both in practice and in case law—they provide the richest backdrop for
study.
So what does a fictional plea look like in the age of collateral consequences? Here
is one example recounted by a defense attorney in Washington state 32: a noncitizen
defendant in a criminal case is faced with a marijuana charge. The defendant fears
that—beyond any criminal penalty for the charge—the conviction will make him
deportable from the United States. After negotiations with the prosecutor, his
attorney arranges a plea to an alternative charge of inhaling toxic fumes, which is a
charge of equal weight under the local state law, but one that does not carry any
potential deportation consequence. He pleads guilty and serves his sentence, the
crisis of his potential deportation averted.
By definition, inhaling toxic fumes does not include the use of marijuana.33 There
was, therefore, no factual basis in the law for such a charge. And yet, the defendant,

30. See infra Part II for a discussion of legal fictions in more detail.
31. Some courts have supported the practice. See, e.g., Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309
(Del. 1988) (finding that a defendant may plead guilty to a nonexistent crime where he receives
a benefit); People v. Myrieckes, 734 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (same); McPherson
v. State, 163 P.3d 1257, 1262–63 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant may plead no contest to a
nonexistent crime as part of a negotiated plea); Spencer v. State, 942 P.2d 646, 649 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that a defendant who was charged with a valid crime, attempted
aggravated assault, “may, pursuant to a beneficial plea agreement knowingly entered, plead
guilty to a nonexistent crime”); People v. Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)
(defendant could plead to an attempt crime, even though no conviction on the same charge
would be available). But a defendant may not be convicted of a nonexistent crime by a jury.
See, e.g., People v. Martinez, 611 N.E.2d 277, 278 (N.Y. 1993) (“While we will allow a
defendant to plead to a nonexistent crime in satisfaction of an indictment charging a crime
with a heavier penalty, . . . [f]or a conviction, a jury must find the defendant guilty of each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but could not do so here because an element
of attempted manslaughter in the first degree as charged is an unintended result that as a matter
of law cannot be attempted.” (citations omitted)). Still other courts have found that pleas to
nonexistent offenses are not valid. People v. Stephenson, 30 P.3d 715, 716–17 (Colo. App.
2000) (finding that the defendant could not be convicted of “attempted felony murder” because
such a crime was not recognized as a statutory offense); In re Personal Restraint of Thompson,
10 P.3d 380, 385 (Wash. 2000) (holding that since a plea must be knowing and voluntary on
the part of the defendant, a plea to a nonexistent crime fails to satisfy the knowledge
requirement).
32. This example is taken from an interview with a public defender in Johnson, supra
note 3, at 925.
33. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.47A.010 (West 2010).
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defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge all agreed to the plea and entered it into the
record. In this case, the fictional plea was used to avoid deportation, which is a
noncriminal penalty imposed for conduct covered under the criminal code.
Like the example given in the Introduction, this case demonstrates the nature of
the factually fictional plea in a case involving collateral consequences. The purpose
of both plea bargains was to avoid a particular noncriminal consequence
—deportation in the one case and sex offender registration and a felony record 34 in
the other. In both cases, all actors in the system—defense attorney, prosecutor, and
judge—were aware that the allegations did not support the conviction, and all parties
agreed to allow the plea to proceed.
As one can see in both examples, fictional pleas are an extension of the sort of
creative bargaining that attorneys have been doing “around” collateral consequences.
For instance, defense attorneys often look for ways to turn an intentional crime into
a reckless crime. 35 This is because it is much more likely for a crime with an
intentional mens rea component to be considered a deportable offense than a crime
that requires a reckless state of mind.36 Defense attorneys report that this sleight of
hand can often be achieved by swapping out one subsection of a particular statute for
another.37 Additionally, even where the parties may not be able to change the statute
under which the defendant pleads guilty, there is also a fair amount of negotiation
over how to change the facts themselves—scrubbing the record of any facts that may
cause trouble in later, noncriminal proceedings. 38 Such scrubbing essentially puts
attorneys—defenders, for the most part—in the role of fiction writer, creating a new
factual narrative to be read into the record.
Despite the embrace by attorneys of fictional pleas, there are few examples of the
practice in case law, particularly in appellate opinions. There are some possible
explanations for this. First, it may be that fewer cases involving bargains over
collateral consequences are making their way to appeals courts. It is unlikely that
defendants in these cases would want to appeal and risk that the conviction might be
overturned, putting them back in the same precarious position where they began. For
this reason, defense attorneys may counsel against an appeal. There may be other
reasons to avoid an appeal. Defense attorneys are repeat players who may gain
benefits for many clients by negotiating multiple times with the same prosecutor and
office. 39 One imagines that a defense attorney who secures a bargain that avoids
collateral consequences through a fictional plea and then challenges the fictional plea

34. Some defense attorneys consider a criminal record itself a form of collateral
consequence since it (1) creates a stigma and (2) may impact any potential arrest or criminal
case in the future. Johnson, supra note 3, at 907–08 n.30.
35. Id. at 924.
36. Amy Wolper, Note, Unconstitutional and Unnecessary: A Cost/Benefit Analysis of
“Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1907, 1928–29 (2010) (noting that some courts interpret the “crimes involving moral
turpitude” requirement for offenses triggering deportation, found in 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i), to require an “evil intent” that goes beyond mere intent to commit a crime).
37. Johnson, supra note 3, at 924–25.
38. Id. at 924.
39. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2469 (2004).
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may be unlikely to see similar offers in future cases. Additionally, it may also be that
judges and lawyers are reluctant to put the nature of the quid pro quo on the record,
and therefore the reason behind the bargain never enters the appeal. Indeed, trial
judges themselves might not understand the nature of the exchange.
But there are some examples of trial and appellate opinions acknowledging these
fictions. For instance, a trial court in Virginia found that a defendant could
“knowingly plead guilty to a crime that he factually did not commit” as long as he
“fully understands that he could not otherwise be convicted of the . . . crime and
asserts that he is entering the plea nonetheless for his own perceived benefit.” 40 In
that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm and a Schedule I or II
drug, instead of what he actually possessed, which was marijuana.41 In this way, he
escaped the mandatory minimum associated with the crime he did commit and got
the benefit of a mandatory minimum for a crime he did not commit. 42 The court
deemed this “legal fiction plea[]”43 totally acceptable.44 An intermediate appellate
court in New York came to a similar conclusion. 45 The court wrote of a defendant
challenging his conviction to criminal trespass, “Defendant concedes he wanted to
avoid the significant stigma of a conviction on the initial class A misdemeanor charge,
an animal cruelty charge, and therefore pleaded guilty to second-degree trespass, also
a class A misdemeanor, even though there was no common factual or legal predicate
for that charge.” 46 The court expressed no issue with the fact that defendant had
pleaded guilty to a crime for which there was no basis, in order to avoid the
“stigma”47 of an animal cruelty charge.48
In other instances, courts have taken issue with prosecutors’ attempts to avoid
collateral consequences by manipulating pleas. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney

40. Commonwealth v. Ayala, No. FE-2018-541, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS 125, at *1 (Va. Cir.
Ct. July 20, 2018).
41. Id. at *2.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *1; see also Rivera v. State, 952 A.2d 396, 409–13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)
(allowing the defendant to plead guilty to a crime he could not have committed for the purpose
of obtaining some other benefit); Rollison v. State, 552 S.E.2d 290, 292–93 (S.C. 2001)
(approving a defendant’s guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, even though the facts did not
support the conviction).
44. Interestingly, the same court strongly disapproved of defendants pleading guilty to
nonexistent crimes because “[o]nly the legislature can create a statutory crime or abrogate a
common law crime.” Ayala, 2018 Va. Cir. LEXIS, at *8.
45. People v. Freeman, 149 A.D.3d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
46. Id. (rejecting the defendant’s arguments on other grounds).
47. Although stigma is not traditionally viewed as a collateral consequence, there are
defense attorneys who consider the stigma of conviction a collateral consequence which
should be avoided. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 907–08 n.30.
48. There are also cases where judges acknowledged the use of factually fictional pleas
where collateral consequences were not at issue. See, e.g., State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676,
680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (“[W]hen a plea is pursuant to a plea bargain, the trial court is not
required to go to the same length to determine whether the facts would support the charge as
it would if there were no plea bargain. This latter rule reflects the reality that often in the
context of a plea bargain, a plea is offered to a crime that does not closely match the conduct
that the factual basis establishes.” (citation omitted)).
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Disciplinary Board v. Howe, the Iowa Supreme Court found that a prosecutor had
violated the rules of professional ethics by amending traffic citations to charge
violations of a cowl-lamp49 statute that would not add points on defendants’ licenses.
Although not as devastating as deportation or sex offender registration, the addition
of points to one’s license is a common collateral consequence that most defendants
in traffic cases wish to avoid. The court held that the attorney, Howe, had violated
the ethical duties of a prosecutor that barred “institut[ing] . . . charges when the
lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.”50
Throughout its opinion, the court rejected the attorney’s arguments that he had
merely been engaged in mutually beneficial plea bargaining. It would not, however,
go so far as to reject fictional pleas altogether, noting
whether or not [a] guilty plea must be supported by a factual basis is a
different question from whether or not the charge must be supported by
probable cause. . . . The fact that a defendant may plead guilty to a traffic
citation without a court determination that there is a factual basis for the
plea simply heightens the duty on the prosecutor to file only those
charges that are supported by probable cause. 51
It seemed then that the objection was to the procedure by which the prosecutor sought
the deal with the defendants, rather than the deal itself.52
B. Who Uses Fictional Pleas and Why?
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court declared that defense attorneys must
inform their clients about the clear deportation consequences of a conviction.53 In the
opinion, Justice Stevens expressed a vision of plea bargaining that involved not just
advising the client about potentially harsh immigration consequences but also
assisting the client in escaping such consequences. As Justice Stevens noted,
“[c]ounsel . . . may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by

49. Cowl is defined as “the top portion of the front part of an automobile body forward of
the two front doors to which are attached the windshield and instrument board.” Cowl,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993).
50. Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368 (Iowa
2005).
51. Id. at 368–69 (emphasis in original).
52. The Iowa Supreme Court did seem to generally frown on the fictional plea, even if it
had been achieved through the normal course of plea bargaining rather than through the
prosecutor’s charging decisions. Id. at 371 (“Oftentimes in a plea bargain situation, probable
cause will be supplied by the defendant’s admission. In the cases at issue here, however, any
admissions by the persons charged were patently and indisputably unbelievable because no
motor vehicle has more than two cowl lamps so as to violate the cowl-lamp statute. Probable
cause cannot rest on such demonstrably false admissions.”).
53. 559 U.S. 356, 369, 374–75 (2010) (deciding on Sixth Amendment grounds that
defense counsel had a duty to give correct immigration advice to a noncitizen defendant when
the law is clear about deportation consequences and finding that where law is not clear, the
defense counsel should give a general warning).
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avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal
consequence.”54
Although not explicitly stated in Padilla, such creative bargaining involves not
just the defense attorney and his client but also the prosecutor and the judge who
agree to allow the plea to proceed. The Court was and is certainly aware of this.
Indeed, in companion cases that followed Padilla—Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v.
Cooper—the Court noted the many benefits that plea bargains afford the parties,
including the resources saved by the prosecutor and courts. 55 Justice Stevens, then,
was not speaking only to defense attorneys in calling for creative bargains; he was
also encouraging prosecutors and judges to accept these pleas.
Fictional pleas are an extension of creative plea bargaining. There are times when
there is very little overlap between the available options that would avoid a particular
collateral consequence and the charges that can be supported by the factual
allegations. In these cases, fictional pleas are used to achieve the purposes of the
creative bargain. And, like all creative bargains, fictional pleas require agreement
among three parties—the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge overseeing the
plea. Such fictions, therefore, have the stamp of approval from each. As this Article
explores below, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges reap different benefits
and face different challenges in using fictional pleas.
1. Defendants
The benefit of the fictional plea to defendants is quite clear—the defendant avoids
a particular severe collateral consequence that is a priority for him to avoid, which is
sometimes a greater priority than avoiding prison time or more serious charges.56 It
is still important to understand, however, that as an offshoot of creative plea
bargaining, fictional pleas require a trade-off for the defendant that is sometimes
different than the trade-off one sees in a “typical” plea bargain. In the typical plea
bargain, the defendant generally accepts a lower charge or lower sentence in
exchange for pleading guilty. The prosecutor saves precious resources, and the
defendant gets a “better” deal than what he would receive if he went to trial and lost.57

54. Id. at 373. This vision expressed by Justice Stevens has been adopted by other courts
in explaining the duties of defense counsel when bargaining on behalf of a noncitizen client.
See, e.g., Song v. United States, No. CV 09-5184 DOC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68465, at *11–
12 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (“Instead, Mr. Song could have asked Counsel to do what the
Supreme Court urged counsel to do in Padilla: ‘plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in
order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by
avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.’
Given that Mr. Song possessed information helpful to the prosecution at the time of entering
into his plea deal, it is reasonably probable to assume that the government would have been
willing to work with Mr. Song in order to formulate a plea agreement that did not render him
automatically removable.” (citations omitted) (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373).
55. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144–45 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169
(2012).
56. See generally Johnson, supra note 3.
57. See Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (“To note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize
it. The potential to conserve valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to admit their
crimes and receive more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement can benefit
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The creative plea bargain, however, involves a different sort of trade-off. The
defendant pleads guilty—saving the prosecutor those same resources—but in
exchange the defendant accepts more punishment or a higher charge than is typically
offered in the same case or than the defendant may have been offered initially in the
case. The purpose of this seemingly bad deal (for the defendant) is that the defendant
will be able to avoid a severe collateral consequence, which is a concern for him.58
The calculus behind the fictional plea is similar for the defendant. The defendant
agrees to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit—creating a record of conduct he
never performed—to sidestep some collateral consequence. His primary goal is
averting the collateral consequences of the criminal charge, and he is willing to make
trades to achieve that goal. Because the benefits to the defendant seem so clear, it is
important to explore the potential downsides to this sort of plea bargaining for
defendants. A positive outcome in any individual case may have many unintended
consequences down the road. Again, one sees the profound paradox of the fictional
plea: the immediacy (and often, profundity) of the payoff masks other hidden issues
with pleading guilty to a fictional charge.
Let’s return to the example that began this piece—the defendant who pleads to
three misdemeanor sex offenses, rather than one felony sex offense. That defendant
has gained a lot. It makes sense why his lawyer sought such a plea—the defendant
has avoided a felony record, he has avoided lifetime sex offender registration, and he
managed also to secure a shorter sentence. These three payoffs are likely worth the
fiction he agreed to present to the court. But he should be mindful that now, instead
of a single charge, the defendant has admitted to unlawful sexual touching on three
occasions. What might this mean for his ability to secure bail in a future case? What
might it mean if he is rearrested? Will he be seen as someone who has already
committed three offenses and does not, therefore, deserve a “fourth” chance? This
defendant now will walk through life with a false record of his conduct. This may be
better than walking through life with an accurate record that results in sex offense
registration. But, as this Article explores later, what might this false record mean for
individual defendants and for the system at large?
In addition, innocent defendants may take advantage of the fictional plea in an
effort to avoid a collateral consequence they should never have been subjected to in
the first place because they are indeed innocent. This is, of course, a critique of plea
bargaining more generally. Innocent defendants plead to get out of prison, to end
long and costly litigation, or for any number of other reasons. 59 But the fictional plea
now creates yet another tool by which the prosecutor can tempt an innocent defendant
into pleading guilty and thereby avoid some other serious, noncriminal consequence.
While this piece explores the broader downsides of the fictional plea in a later Section,
it is worth noting the specific downsides to individual defendants, who appear to be
the beneficiaries of the fictional plea.

both parties.”).
58. See id.
59. NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration
/Pages/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/CJ93-8LPX], provides dozens of examples of innocent
defendants who pleaded guilty and were later exonerated. To search for cases that ended with
a plea bargain, go to “Detailed View” and search under “Tags” by “P” by guilty plea.
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2. Prosecutors
Defense attorneys, of course, must negotiate fictional pleas with their counterparts
across the aisle. Unlike the typical creative plea bargain, the fictional plea requires a
certain level of collusion among defense attorneys and prosecutors. Prosecutors
—aware that the charge does not match the factual allegations—must be prepared to
defend their decision to offer the plea in the first place. A fictional plea can be a
tricky bargain to strike.
Although there is little direct evidence of prosecutors openly embracing fictional
pleas, there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence about the use of fictional pleas
by prosecutors to assist defendants in avoiding collateral consequences. As this
Section explains, as a group of progressive prosecutors begins to draw national
attention, there is a growing acceptance, among a certain group of prosecutors, that
prosecutors should negotiate pleas that hold the defendant accountable in the
criminal justice system, while not subjecting him to, what they see as, extreme
punishment outside of the system.
Prosecutors are accustomed to exercising their discretion freely and in ways that
align with their judgment of “doing justice.” This involves, at times, not enforcing
laws that do not align with their priorities.60 The regular use of plea bargains in a
range of cases is part of this exercise of discretion. As William Stuntz noted, plea
bargaining has little to do with the substantive law at issue in any given case and
much more to do with a range of factors outside of the law, including, most critically,
the preferences of the prosecutor.61 The practice of fictional pleas is, therefore, very
much in the prosecutor’s wheelhouse.
In the case of fictional pleas, prosecutors are using their discretion to shape false
narratives. They are lying on the record—either overtly or impliedly—with full
knowledge of their false account. This is not to say that defense counsel and
prosecutors always agree as to what constitutes the “facts” of a case. Indeed, there
are many cases where there are legitimate disagreements about the answer to the
question, “what happened?” and, relatedly, should the defendant be held responsible.
But what happens in cases involving fictional pleas is that the parties essentially
agree to the underlying facts, but then collude to find a plea that does not, in fact,
relate to those facts.

60. Marijuana enforcement at both the local and state level is an example of this exercise
of discretion. Some state prosecutors have committed to decreasing marijuana prosecutions,
even where police officers continue to make arrests. Brandon E. Patterson, Philadelphia’s New
DA Found an Innovative Way to Legalize Pot––and Other Cities Should Pay Attention,
MOTHER JONES (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:27 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice
/2018/03/philadelphias-new-da-found-an-innovative-way-to-legalize-pot-and-other-cities
-should-pay-attention [https://perma.cc/2TM8-7C8W]. Under the Obama administration, the
Justice Department pursued a policy of limited enforcement of federal marijuana laws. That
policy has now been reversed by the Trump administration. Corky Siemaszko, Sessions To
End Legal Marijuana Policy from Obama Era, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 10:26 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/sessions-end-obama-era-policy-legalized
-marijuana-n834591 [https://perma.cc/GCN7-GCMH].
61. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548–50 (2004).
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i. The “New” District Attorney
As David Sklansky has documented, progressive prosecutors have been elected
across the United States. 62 These are prosecutors who made campaign promises to
reduce incarceration63 and take police violence seriously.64 As this Section discusses,
they are also seemingly committed to mitigating the punitive effects of certain
collateral consequences.
Even before this broader trend toward progressivism,65 many district attorneys’
offices had policies—either formal or informal—that allowed them to take into
consideration collateral consequences during plea bargaining negotiations. Several
local offices in California instituted policies to account for the impact of collateral
consequences, especially on noncitizen defendants.66 In Los Angeles, for instance,
prosecutors have had, for many years, a written policy that “explicitly allow[s them]
to consider the adverse immigration consequences of deportation in arriving at an
appropriate case disposition.”67 Additionally, the office has shown an openness to
mitigating other collateral consequences outside of deportation. As one Los Angeles
assistant district attorney noted, the office “weigh[s] collateral consequences on a
‘sort of sliding scale’” in making decisions about how to proceed with cases. 68
But in recent years, and certainly since the election of an administration
obsessively focused on “criminal aliens,”69 an increasing number of district attorneys’

62. David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected Prosecutors, 14
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 647 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape];
David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
ONLINE 25 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, The Handbook]. There are, however, critics of the
term—“progressive prosecutor”—who see it as public relations mechanism, more than a true
statement of a particular district attorneys’ values. E.g., Josie Duffy Rice, Opinion, Cyrus
Vance and the Myth of the Progressive Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/opinion/cy-vance-progressive-prosecutor.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/P6CF-GY4P] (criticizing several prosecutors who make claims about their
progressivism but do little to end mass incarceration).
63. Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape, supra note 62, at 647–48.
64. Id.
65. As this Section makes clear, popular media has been particularly focused on the role
of the “progressive prosecutor.” See, e.g., Christie Thompson, Prosecutors Are Quietly
Helping Protect Immigrants from Trump, VICE (May 18, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/pg7wvn/prosecutors-are-quietly-helping-protect-immigrants
-from-trump [https://perma.cc/JEV8-XKFK].
66. Ingrid Eagly documented these policies in her piece, Immigrant Protective Policies in
Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245 (2016) [hereinafter Eagly, Immigrant Protective
Policies]. She also compiled a library of these formal policies. Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigration
Enforcement and Criminal Adjudication: Introduction, UCLA SCH. L., http://libguides
.law.ucla.edu/immigrationandcriminaladjudication [https://perma.cc/37DW-2PWE] (last
updated May 10, 2018).
67. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies, supra note 66, at 266 (footnote omitted).
68. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local
Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1164 (2013) (quoting an interview with a high-ranking
prosecutor in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office).
69. As an example, President Trump has put in place an office to assist “victims of crimes
committed by criminal aliens.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., DHS Announces
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offices have announced new policies regarding noncitizen defendants.70 In Brooklyn,
the District Attorney has instituted a policy to limit immigration consequences for
defendants facing low-level offenses.71 District Attorney Eric Gonzalez took over for
Ken Thompson, who died unexpectedly in October of 2016 and was himself
considered to be a “progressive prosecutor.”72 Gonzalez has been vocal that his office
is specifically working to reach “immigration-neutral” dispositions.73 As an example,
he cites his office’s willingness to allow a defendant in a shoplifting case to plead
guilty to a disorderly conduct violation rather than petit larceny, which is a “crime of
moral turpitude” under immigration law. 74 But such a policy indicates that the formal
directive from the office is that a line prosecutor should offer (or, at least,
contemplate offering) disorderly conduct—a charge that does not include any theft

Launch of New Office for Victims of Illegal Immigrant Crime (Apr. 26, 2017), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2017/04/26/dhs-announces-launch-new-office-victims-illegal-immigrant
-crime [https://perma.cc/UFG6-3KX6].
70. It is beyond the scope of this Article but worth noting that in California it is now the
law that both prosecutors and defense attorneys take into consideration the impact on the
defendant of any immigration consequences that stem from the criminal charge. The new law,
which went into effect on January 1, 2016, reads:
Immigration consequences; duties of counsel
(a) Defense counsel shall provide accurate and affirmative advice about the
immigration consequences of a proposed disposition, and when consistent with
the goals of and with the informed consent of the defendant, and consistent with
professional standards, defend against those consequences.
(b) The prosecution, in the interests of justice, and in furtherance of the findings
and declarations of Section 1016.2, shall consider the avoidance of adverse
immigration consequences in the plea negotiation process as one factor in an
effort to reach a just resolution.
(c) This code section shall not be interpreted to change the requirements of
Section 1016.5, including the requirement that no defendant shall be required to
disclose his or her immigration status to the court.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.3 (West 2018). For a full discussion of changes to California that
implicate many of these issues, including new rules regulating the negotiating of plea bargains
see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California,
20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 12 (2017).
71. Andrew Denney, Brooklyn DA Aiming to Limit Immigration Impact for Low-Level
Offenders, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 24, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com
/id=1202784443346/Brooklyn-DA-Aiming-to-Limit-Immigration-Impact-for-LowLevel
-Offenders?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL [https://perma.cc/89RN-P72P]. These
formal policies are new, but individual line prosecutors in Brooklyn would sometimes take
into account collateral consequences during plea negotiations even without a formal policy.
As Heidi Altman documented in her article, Prosecuting Post-Padilla: State Interests and the
Pursuit of Justice for Noncitizen Defendants, 101 GEO. L.J. 1, 28–32 (2012), individual line
prosecutors in Brooklyn would sometimes take into account collateral consequences during
plea negotiations, even without a formal policy.
72. Alan Feuer, Ken Thompson’s Successor: A ‘Pure District Attorney’ Working Under
the Radar, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/28/nyregion/
brooklyn-district-attorney-eric-gonzalez.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/6DK9-QV9Z].
73. Denney, supra note 71.
74. Id.
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element—for the purpose of allowing the defendant to avoid collateral consequences.
Although there is no mention of fictional pleas in the policy, such messages to line
prosecutors indicate an openness to plea convictions that do not match the factual
allegations.
Other offices have followed suit. In Baltimore, the Chief Deputy State’s Attorney
sent a memo to his staff informing them that the Justice Department’s deportation
efforts under President Trump “have increased the potential collateral consequences
to certain immigrants for minor, non-violent criminal conduct.” 75 As a result, he
directed the attorneys: “In considering the appropriate disposition of a minor, nonviolent criminal case, please be certain to consider those potential consequences to
the victim, witnesses, and the defendant.” 76 In Philadelphia, the current District
Attorney is a longtime criminal defense attorney who is critical of the criminal justice
system, including the impact of collateral consequences on defendants. 77 Dan
Satterberg, the prosecuting attorney for Seattle and a Republican, instituted an
immigration-consequences policy in his office in 2016, which, according to the New
York Times, he “strengthened” after the election of President Trump. 78 In explaining
why he no longer thought it was appropriate to handle the cases of defendants facing
immigration consequences the same way he handled other cases, he noted, “[M]ore
and more, my eyes are open that treating people the same means that there isn’t a life
sentence of deportation that might accompany [a] conviction.”79 Cyrus Vance, the
District Attorney from Manhattan, made a similar statement in justifying a new
Collateral Consequences Counsel position: “I submit today that if two New Yorkers
commit the same low-level violation, and the practical consequences for one of the
New Yorkers is a ticket or a couple of days in jail, while the consequences for the
other New Yorker is to be taken away from her family and shipped off to a foreign
country, that is not equal justice under the law.” 80

75. Justin Fenton, Baltimore Prosecutors Told To Consider Consequences for
Prosecuting Illegal Immigrants for Minor Crimes, BALT. SUN (Apr. 28, 2017, 5:35 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-states-attorney-immigrants
-20170428-story.html [https://perma.cc/6QVR-374P].
76. Id. (emphasis added); see also Collier Meyerson, Prosecutors Keep Their Jobs by
Putting People in Jail. Can They Be Leaders in the Fight for Criminal-Justice Reform?,
NATION (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-keep-their-jobs-by
-putting-people-in-jail-can-they-be-leaders-in-the-fight-for-criminal-justice-reform [https://
perma.cc/G66V-VFP9].
77. Shaun King, Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner Promised a Criminal Justice Revolution.
He’s Exceeding Expectations, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://theintercept
.com/2018/03/20/larry-krasner-philadelphia-da
[https://perma.cc/F83W-DZS4];
Sam
Newhouse, Running to Change How Philadelphia Does Justice, METRO (Feb. 21, 2017),
http://www.metro.us/philadelphia/running-to-change-how-philly-does-justice/zsJqbt---GHf2
Jnay4lLk [https://perma.cc/U8MZ-N2KY].
78. Vivian Yee, Prosecutors’ Dilemma: Will Conviction Lead to ‘Life Sentence of
Deportation’?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/us
/prosecutors-dilemma-will-conviction-lead-to-life-sentence-of-deportation.html
[https://perma.cc/7HPD-WPT6].
79. Id.
80. Ramey, supra note 13.
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These district attorneys—sometimes emboldened by Trump’s election—are
shifting their policies to include explicit concern about the collateral consequences
that may harm the defendant as the result of the plea bargain. As this Article explains
in greater depth in Section II.B, in many cases there simply is no way to reach a plea
that avoids serious collateral consequences and also lines up with the factual
allegations against the defendant. It flows from these policies that prosecutors will
be open to fictional pleas in certain cases where such a plea may be the only solution
to holding the defendant accountable in the criminal system, while allowing him to
sidestep particular sanctions outside of the system.
It is also the critics of this practice who provide evidence that prosecutors are
embracing the fictional plea. In recent debates in Ohio about adopting a state rule
similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, critics pointed to the regular use
of fictional pleas in sex offense cases. Justice Michael P. Donnelly of the Supreme
Court of Ohio, formerly a judge on the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, has
argued for a local state rule that would require a recitation of the facts underlying any
plea that is accepted by the court. As part of his evidence that his proposal is
necessary, he cited 400 felony charges from 2008 to 2014 in sex-crimes cases that
were reduced through plea bargains to non-sex-crime offenses.81 He noted that the
most common reduced charges were abduction, felonious assault, or child
endangerment82—all serious crimes that allow the defendant to avoid sex offender
registration and do not necessarily involve a factual overlap with the underlying
charges.
ii. Benefits to Prosecutors
As Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez has noted, the purpose of plea
bargain policies that take into account collateral consequences is to “hold people
accountable without their suffering enormous and disproportionate consequences for
a low-level offense.”83 Gonzalez has said that he hopes these sorts of policies will
become a model for prosecutors nationwide. 84 Particularly as the Trump

81. The 400 number was generated by original research by Justice Donnelly. Rachel
Dissell, Should Ohio Ban Judges from Allowing Plea Deals That Are ‘Lies’? (Poll),
CLEVELAND.COM (May 30, 2015), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2015/05
/should_ohio_change_what_plea_d.html [https://perma.cc/G8TW-RLJA].
82. Id.
83. Q & A with Brooklyn Acting District Attorney Eric Gonzalez, OUR TIME PRESS (July
16, 2017), http://www.ourtimepress.com/q-a-with-brooklyn-acting-district-attorney-ericgonzalez [https://perma.cc/4W5M-QR6H]. In a later interview with the Wall Street Journal,
Gonzalez noted that one of his inspirations for this formal policy was the case of a Brooklyn
man who was arrested for being “unescorted in an apartment building” and then later found to
have a small amount of crack cocaine on him. The man, a green card holder from Haiti, pleaded
guilty to the drug possession charge and was eventually unable to reenter the country after a
trip outside of the country. According to Gonzalez, he could have, instead, pleaded guilty to
trespass and would not have been barred from the United States. This is an example where a
creative plea bargain to a particular crime would have been available that lined up with the
factual allegations against the defendant. Ramey, supra note 13.
84. Christina Carrega, Brooklyn DA Eric Gonzalez Launches Campaign with Plan To
Ditch Old Summons Warrants, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://
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administration advances more aggressive “law and order” policies directed towards
immigrants,85 we are likely to see more local offices responding with a softening of
their respective policies towards defendants facing collateral consequences.
Prosecutors reap political benefits by using fictional pleas. In places like Brooklyn,
Baltimore, and Philadelphia where a growing number of voters are concerned about
mass incarceration and the treatment of defendants,86 embracing these policies shows
that prosecutors can enforce the criminal law, while not having defendants “suffer
enormous and disproportionate consequences.” This is likely why prosecutors are
not shy about such policies. Prosecutors have recently given interviews to the New
York Times, the Washington Post, and other publications to champion these
policies.87 In doing so, they are making political statements that they are in a tight
spot between their obligations to enforce criminal law and their view that criminal
law is being manipulated for other purposes. They are wiggling out of this tight spot
by creating policies that rein in the consequences of criminal convictions.
The other political benefit at this particular moment is making a clear statement
against the policies of an unpopular federal government. There is a sense that these
policies serve as a form of resistance to the current administration’s stance on a wide
range of criminal justice issues. The federal system has seen a shift from an
administration devoted to criminal justice reform to one that is antagonistic to it. The
Department of Justice under President Obama granted a record number of federal
inmates early release under a highly publicized clemency effort, 88 softened its
charging policies on drug laws, 89 and pursued a massive sentencing reform
initiative.90 The Trump administration has struck a notably different tone. Former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions threw out old policies on charging in drug cases 91
and talked of fully prosecuting individuals on marijuana charges in states where it is
legal under state law.92

www.nydailynews.com/new-york/gonzalez-launches-brooklyn-district-attorney-campaign
-article-1.3103917 [https://perma.cc/5UHB-ETYV].
85. The President has suggested as part of a “law and order” agenda on immigration that
the United States deny due process to noncitizens entering the country. Benjamin Hart, Trump
Suggests Suspending Rule of Law for Undocumented Immigrants, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER
(June 24, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/06/trump-floats-suspending-lawsfor-undocumented-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/KB2Z-B7US].
86. See supra Section I.B.1.
87. Many of the quotes from prosecutors in this Section have come from articles in
national publications. See, e.g., Ramey, supra note 13.
88. Sari Horwitz, Obama to Commute Hundreds of Federal Drug Sentences in Final
Grants of Clemency, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/world/national-security/obama-to-commute-hundreds-of-federal-drug-sentences-in-final
-grants-of-clemency/2017/01/16/c99b4ba6-da5e-11e6-b8b2-cb5164beba6b_story.html?utm
_term=.e94a6f57f554 [https://perma.cc/U9L7-RVGG].
89. HOLDER, supra note 25.
90. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
91. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions on Department Charging
and Sentencing Policy to All Federal Prosecutors (May 10, 2017), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/53WY-C3HF].
92. See Press Release, White House, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing
H.R. 244 into Law (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
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Much of this change in tone has little impact on the functioning of state criminal
justice systems. It has, however, resulted in increasing pressure on progressive state
prosecutors to publicly stand in opposition to the harsh approach to defendants by
federal prosecutors. This “new prosecutor” is progressive on many fronts, including
charging, sentencing, and an openness to diversion. 93 However, even state
prosecutors who would not consider themselves particularly progressive have been
moved to change policy, at least in part by President Trump’s insistence that state
law enforcement cooperate with federal immigration authorities. 94 The federal focus
on immigration has shined a spotlight on the devastating effects of collateral
consequences, even though those effects were just as devastating before Trump’s
election.
Finally, it is important to note that certainly not all prosecutors are engaged in this
practice. As Brian McIntyre, the county attorney for Cochise County, Arizona, noted
in an interview, his prosecutors are not to consider collateral consequences so as not
to benefit some defendants over others. 95 Some prosecutors may even go a step
further, specifically seeking to impose collateral consequences on certain defendants.
Indeed, as Paul Crane has observed, district attorneys may use collateral
consequences strategically, “undercharging” in certain cases in order to secure “the
penalty they desire” without having to deal with the greater procedural safeguards in
place for felony charges. 96 Unlike felony cases, for example, where prosecutors are
obligated to present witnesses and evidence to grand juries in probable cause
hearings or to judges in preliminary hearings, misdemeanor cases do not have this
requirement. Even when a defendant is facing significant collateral consequences,
prosecutors may initiate misdemeanor cases without a grand jury proceeding. 97 As
Eisha Jain argues, prosecutors have “powerful incentives to ‘prosecute’ collateral
consequences—meaning that they at times use their vast and unreviewable discretion
over the criminal justice system to shape civil outcomes.” 98
3. Judges
What then is the motivation for judges to accept fictional pleas? One reason might
be that judges, like defendants and prosecutors, are accustomed to the regular use of
plea bargaining. Judges, like other stakeholders, benefit from the typical plea bargain.
Plea bargains keep the system moving along at a regular clip. This benefit is
particularly critical in those jurisdictions where the dockets are already swollen with
cases. As Michelle Alexander has noted, if you want to “crash the system,” go to

/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-h-r-244-law [https://perma.cc/XE4E-82VU].
93. See supra Section I.B.2.i.
94. See supra Section I.B.2.i.
95. Yee, supra note 78 (“If he made accommodations for an immigrant, Mr. McIntyre
said, he felt that he would also owe a citizen in similar circumstances the same option, ‘because
is he not being, essentially, negatively impacted by his U.S. citizenry?’”).
96. Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775, 780, 782
(2016).
97. Id. at 802–03.
98. Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1200 (2016).
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trial.99 Plea bargains avoid this outcome. Judges, therefore, have a strong interest in
making sure that pleas are accepted.
Although the role of a judge varies by jurisdiction, formally, judges have little
role in the plea bargaining process. A judge must confirm that the defendant is
pleading guilty both knowingly and voluntarily, 100 but generally that is where their
participation appears to end. Most states and the federal system prohibit the judge
from participating in the negotiation of a plea bargain. It is plausible then that judges
accept fictional pleas because their traditional role in this regard has been to stamp
approval on the agreements of the parties, without much inquiry into the nature of
the deal.101
But this view of judges seems too limited and does not fully explain why judges
accept fictional pleas—bargains where the plea of conviction does not match any of
the factual allegations against the defendant. One explanation might be that judges
are not always aware that they are accepting a fictional plea. Because some cases,
particularly misdemeanors, do not require a full factual record be developed, 102 it
might be the case that judges do not know that a particular plea is a fictional plea. In
states where there is no requirement that the parties put a factual basis for the plea
on the record, there is the risk that the judge has no idea how the parties reached
agreement.103 Indeed, in the process of investigation, it is common for prosecutors to
discover additional facts and evidence. With such discovery, the negotiations with
the defendant may evolve, leading to a plea bargain that looks very different from
the charges in the initial complaint.104
But what about cases—like the one described in the Introduction to this piece—
where the judge inquires or is made aware of the fiction? A recent groundbreaking
study by Nancy King and Ronald Wright makes clear that many more judges likely
fall into this “active” category (i.e., judges who participate in the plea bargaining
among the parties) than most scholars previously thought. As King and Wright
observe in their study, there are many potential benefits to judicial involvement in
plea bargaining.105 As a result, despite the common wisdom that judges take a hands-

99. Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice
-system.html [https://perma.cc/9UCJ-4PRX].
100. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970).
101. At least one scholar has proposed that parties litigate a pre-plea motion that would
give judges more control over the plea system and therefore more guidance to defendants
about their options. E.g., Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 65 (2015).
102. See infra Section I.C.1.
103. Author’s phone interview with Justice Michael P. Donnelly, Supreme Court of Ohio
(Jan. 12, 2018) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
104. As noted in Section I.A.1, it is more difficult to “see” a factual fiction than a fiction
of law, which requires the judge to sign off on a plea to a nonexistent crime. In those cases,
there is little chance that a judge would not realize that the defendant is pleading guilty to a
fiction.
105. As King and Wright observed in their study, there are several seeming benefits of
judicial involvement in plea bargaining. As they note, “judicial participation accelerates pleas,
shifting deals away from the eve of trial to earlier in the process.” Nancy J. King & Ronald F.
Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial
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off approach to these agreements, they may indeed be actively involved and like the
judge in the Introduction, may also understand that they are accepting a fictional plea
on the record.106 As Darryl K. Brown notes, the vision of judicial participation at plea
bargaining laid out by King and Wright is of a judge who is less “managerial” and
more “inquisitorial”—one who gets into the mix of litigation.107
So why do judges—as neutral arbiters of the process—participate in fictional
pleas? (Of course, there are judges for whom active judging means they do not accept
fictional pleas.)108 One reason may be that, like other forms of plea bargaining, they
are efficient. As King and Wright point out, docket control is a strong motivator for
judges to become involved in the plea bargain process. 109 Because fictional pleas are
often the only solution that will satisfy both the needs of the defendant—to avoid
collateral consequences—and the needs of the prosecutor—to hold the defendant
accountable within the system without a trial—the fictional plea can be the final
development before the parties are forced to go to trial. For instance, many
defendants will roll the dice at trial rather than accept a plea of conviction to a
deportable offense.110 Because many fictional pleas are meant to avoid trials, they
are also appealing to a judge who wants to keep cases moving off his docket.
In addition, the same zeitgeist around collateral consequences that has gripped
lawyers and the public at large has certainly also had an impact on judges. Reaction
to federal immigration law produces one of the clearest examples. In Padilla, Justice
Stevens acknowledged the realities facing noncitizens, including that immigration
judges have limited discretion to grant noncitizens relief from removal. 111 Such
limitations on immigration judges create new incentives for criminal court judges,
who interact so frequently with defendants facing deportable offenses, to become
more proactive in seeking solutions for these noncitizens. It is now common
knowledge that there will be no opportunities for these defendants to seek relief

Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 393 (2016). This results in a more efficient
system. In addition, when “judges are invited to help resolve a criminal case, they sometimes
propose alternative ideas for sentencing that the parties had overlooked.” Id. at 394.
Additionally, “judge’s participation also appears to help attorneys retain the confidence of
clients, victims, and other constituencies.” Id. at 395. Finally, “[j]udicial participation can
increase, rather than decrease, the amount of information available to the defense at the
negotiation stage.” Id. at 396.
106. But see Darryl K. Brown, Response, What’s the Matter with Kansas—And Utah?:
Explaining Judicial Interventions in Plea Bargaining, 95 TEX. L. REV. 47, 52–59 (2017)
(explaining how rules of criminal procedure in Kansas and Utah make judicial participation at
plea bargaining less likely).
107. Id. at 59–61.
108. Interview with Justice Michael Donnelly, supra note 103 (noting that he makes the
parties discuss all plea bargaining decisions on the record, requires a factual basis for each
plea, and does not accept pleas where no such basis exists).
109. See King & Wright, supra note 105, at 356–57.
110. This question—whether a noncitizen defendant would go to trial, even in the face of
overwhelming evidence against him, where he was facing a deportable charge—was the
question before the Supreme Court in Lee v. United States. 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2017). As
the defendant in Lee argued, successfully, before the Supreme Court, indeed it is a rational
choice for a defendant to take the risk of trial rather than agree to being deported. Id. at 1969.
111. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 363–64 (2010).
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elsewhere. The judge who rejects a plea bargain because it is a fiction, must, in many
cases, face the possibility that the defendant before him will be deported. One can
see courts openly grappling with some of these issues in sentencing matters where
the defendant is also facing serious collateral consequences—should a judge take this
“outside” factor into account when sentencing the defendant for his criminal case?112
As Jessica Roth has observed, many federal trial judges are becoming increasingly
open about their desire to see criminal justice reforms put into place. 113 This “new”
activism conflicts with traditional expectations for how judges behave but appears to
be motivated, in part, about concerns over the collateral consequences of a
conviction.114 As Roth notes, several judges in either panel discussions, extrajudicial
writings, or legal opinions have expressed deep concern about collateral
consequences.115 This open call for reform includes two opinions by Judge Gleeson
of the Eastern District of New York, in which he granted expungement of a criminal
conviction and a “certificat[ion] of rehabilitation” to two defendants who made
compelling claims that their convictions were harming their prospects for
employment. 116 There are also dramatic examples of state and federal judges
expressing their disdain for the immigration policies of the current administration. 117

112. See, e.g., United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 474–75 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that
the loss of the defendant’s “teaching certificate and his state pension as a result of his conduct”
were appropriate sentencing considerations); United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F. Supp. 3d 179,
180 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Nonetheless, I render[] a non-incarceratory sentence today in part
because of a number of statutory and regulatory collateral consequences [the defendant] will
face as a convicted felon. I have incorporated those consequences in the balancing of the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in imposing a one-year probationary sentence.”). But see United
States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423, 445 (10th Cir. 2015) (“We agree with the reasoning of
the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. By considering publicity, loss of law license, and
deterioration of physical and financial health as punishment, the court impermissibly focused
on the collateral consequences of Morgan’s prosecution and conviction.”).
113. Jessica A. Roth, The “New” District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform, 72
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 189 (2018) (“[O]ver the last decade, a cohort of well-respected
and experienced federal trial judges have engaged in an unmistakably public campaign for
criminal justice reform that causes them to look more like players than umpires.”).
114. Id. at 198–202.
115. Id. at 205–09.
116. Id. at 206–08 (discussing Judge Gleeson’s decisions in Doe v. United States (Doe I),
110 F. Supp. 3d 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Doe v. United States (Doe II), 168 F. Supp. 3d 427
(E.D.N.Y 2016)).
117. See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Federal Judge Blasts ICE for ‘Cruel’ Tactics, Frees
Immigrant Rights Activist Ravi Ragbir, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/01/29/federal-judge-blasts-ice-for-cruel
-tactics-frees-immigrant-rights-activist-ravi-ragbir/?utm_term=.e7806dc0ca7d [https://perma
.cc/C8UK-33XR] (“It ought not be—and it has never before been—that those who have lived
without incident in this country for years are subjected to treatment we associate with regimes
we revile as unjust, regimes where those who have long lived in a country may be taken
without notice from streets, home, and work. And sent away . . . . We are not that country . . .
and woe be the day that we become that country under a fiction that laws allow it.”); Kristine
Phillips, California Chief Justice to ICE: Stop ‘Stalking’ Immigrants at Courthouses, WASH.
POST, (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017
/03/17/california-chief-justice-to-ice-stop-stalking-immigrants-at-courthouses/?utm_term=
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Such examples of judges’ open sympathy for the plight of defendants facing severe
collateral consequences provide some evidence that judges, already inclined to
accept the agreement of the parties, may not feel compelled to put an end to the
workaround that fictional pleas provide.

C. Common Examples of the Fictional Plea
The criminal system has become a repository for a staggering number of sanctions
and punishments—both criminal and noncriminal. Under a theory that the criminal
system has identified those deserving of punishment, legislatures have piled high the
number of sanctions for any given charge. This Section traces the three scenarios in
which fictional pleas are used to greatest effect: low-level offenses, drug crimes, and
sex offenses.
1. Low-Level Offenses
Criminal grounds for deportation of immigrants, including lawful permanent
residents, have become so expansive that various low-level offenses and virtually all
controlled substance offenses will lead to removal. 118 There is a common
understanding among scholars and advocates alike that misdemeanors carry with
them substantial and serious collateral consequences. One only needs to peruse the
American Bar Association’s exhaustive list of collateral consequences 119 to
understand how many seemingly petty criminal offenses lead to non-petty
consequences outside of the criminal system. A conviction for turnstile jumping,
theft of a ten-dollar video game, forging a check for less than twenty dollars,
misdemeanor indecent exposure, and petty shoplifting are all examples of minor
offenses considered crimes of “moral turpitude” under immigration law120 that could

.0b93f53d2380 [https://perma.cc/R6HY-SLPW].
118. Jennifer M. Chacón, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 252
(2017); Jordan Cunnings, Comment, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens:
Uncounseled Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 532 (2015).
119. See COUNCIL ST. GOV’T JUST. CTR., supra note 4.
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
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render a noncitizen deportable.121 Traffic convictions are the “single largest source
of the rise in criminal alien removals over the past decade.”122
Although they carry profound noncriminal consequences, low-level offenses have
the benefit of offering much more flexibility to negotiate around collateral
consequences than felonies for a few reasons. First, the stakes at sentencing are lower
in misdemeanor cases, for the defendant and the prosecutor. Indeed, sentences tend
to be shorter in misdemeanor cases.123 As a result, the sentence itself may be less
important to the defendant than avoiding the collateral consequence. Conversely, a
defendant may care very much about his sentencing exposure if he is facing serious
prison time, shifting his goal from avoiding a particular collateral consequence to
reducing his sentence. For the prosecutor, higher potential sentences and more
serious criminal charges may mean she is less inclined to make deals around
collateral consequences.124 It is more palatable for prosecutors to negotiate (or admit
to negotiating) around collateral consequences when dealing with misdemeanors. As
one prosecutor noted, consideration of collateral consequences “will not be extended
to serious or violent crimes.”125
Second, as noted, there tend to be fewer procedural restrictions on misdemeanor
pleas as compared to felonies. The New York case of People v. Keizer makes the
point. There, the defendant was charged with petit larceny for shoplifting books from
a Barnes & Noble.126 At arraignment he pleaded to disorderly conduct in exchange
for a conditional discharge. The defendant appealed, arguing that the plea was
jurisdictionally defective because he pleaded to an offense that was neither charged
in the complaint nor constituted a lesser included offense.127 The New York Court of
Appeals found that

121. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2013); see also Jillian T. Stein, Immigration Considerations
for Noncitizens in Criminal Cases, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2017, at 66, 68 (“[E]ven turnstile jumping
qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude and can subject a noncitizen to removal.”); Glenn E.
Martin, A Breakthrough Twist of the Turnstile from Manhattan DA Cy Vance, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (July 19, 2017, 12: 28 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/breakthrough-twistturnstile-manhattan-da-cy-vance-article-1.3338588 [https://perma.cc/F9TQ-KMW8] (noting
that pleading guilty to turnstile jumping can result in collateral consequences, including
deportation); James C. McKinley, Jr., For Manhattan Fare Beaters, One-Way Ticket to Court
May Be Over, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30
/nyregion/subway-fare-beating-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/8Z8D-S9J9] (pointing out
that criminal prosecution of fare evasion may put immigrants at risk of deportation).
122. Eagly, supra note 68, at 1218 (“[T]he category of criminal aliens removed as a result
of a traffic offense increased ten-fold over the past decade, accounting for nearly thirty percent
of the overall rise in criminal alien removals.”).
123. See generally Johnson, supra note 3, at 927–30 (discussing the reasons that it is easier
to plead around collateral consequences on misdemeanor cases rather than felony cases).
124. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 930–31.
125. Yee, supra note 78.
126. 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (N.Y. 2003).
127. Id. at 1151; see also People v. Peralta, Nos. 57068/01, 01-392, 2003 WL 21174608,
at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Apr. 29, 2003) (per curiam) (holding that a plea to disorderly conduct
“in satisfaction of an information charging him with several marihuana-related offenses” was
not jurisdictionally deficient).
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[a] prosecutor cannot bring an indictment or felony complaint and then
attempt to avoid [certain] protections . . . by soliciting a plea to alleged
criminal activity that has no common element (in law or fact) to the
crimes alleged in the indictment or felony complaint. By contrast,
[Keizer] concerns misdemeanors . . . . The specific constitutional
limitations, and their underlying policies, that restrict the plea process for
felony charges are not present here.128
As Keizer demonstrates, misdemeanor pleas often do not require the same procedural
hurdles as felony pleas.129
Third, there are more options for alternatives to incarceration in misdemeanor
court.130 That means that there are greater opportunities for defense counsel to trade
on the punishment end when trying to secure a fictional plea. As a result, prosecutors
are more likely to play ball. As Jeff Rosen, the district attorney in Santa Clara,
California, has noted, his office is often willing to trade a lesser charge for more jail
or probation: “If we’re giving something, we’re going to get something.” 131 In fact,
defense attorneys report that prosecutors are more willing to discuss the mitigation
of collateral consequences on lower-level offenses as opposed to felonies because of
these greater options.132 For these reasons, in misdemeanor cases, defendants may be
more likely to negotiate around collateral consequences, and prosecutors may be
more open to fictional pleas.
Partly, this is made possible by the nature of misdemeanors and other low-level
crimes. As the Keizer court made clear, misdemeanors tend not to require a full
factual record—or any record—be made at the time of the plea.133 As a result, “the
reality [is] that often in the context of a plea bargain, a plea is offered to a crime that
does not closely match the conduct that the factual basis establishes.” 134 The lack of
a factual basis in most misdemeanor plea colloquies means that there is more room
for the fictional plea.
And although usually used against defendants, the dearth of safeguards allows for
prosecutors to manipulate misdemeanors to benefit defendants. 135 Petty offenses
provide a relatively easy way for prosecutors to demonstrate leniency and mercy in
a low-stakes context. There have been several recent calls for prosecutors to end
prosecutions against noncitizens in petty offense cases.136 A prosecutor might not be

128. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1152.
129. A lower court in New York relied on Keizer in finding that a defendant, who was
alleged to have been sitting in his running car while intoxicated and charged with driving while
intoxicated, could plead to reckless driving, as long as the record for the proposed disposition
was placed on the record. People v. Crandall, 39 A.D.3d 1077, 1077–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007).
130. As the below discussion of United States v. Lee demonstrates, when a defendant
pleads to a misdemeanor, the range of possible attached punishments is wide ranging
compared to a plea to a felony. See infra Section I.C.2.
131. Yee, supra note 78.
132. Johnson, supra note 3, at 931–34.
133. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d at 1154.
134. State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
135. See Crane, supra note 96, at 806–11, 828.
136. See, e.g., Protect NY Immigrants from Trump! Halt Broken Windows!, MOVE ON,
https://petitions.moveon.org/sign/protect-ny-immigrants
[https://perma.cc/Z2PH-ZK29]
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willing to give up the opportunity to prosecute a defendant altogether but may very
well be willing to resolve the matter with a fictional plea. Given the flexibility that
low-level cases provide, it is not surprising that fictional pleas are more frequently
found in misdemeanor court.
2. Drug Crimes
Virtually all drug crimes—both misdemeanor and felony—are removable
offenses under immigration law.137 Whole families have been kicked out of public
housing because one member of the family used marijuana.138 Young people have
lost student aid for low-level drug possession offenses. 139 As Gabriel J. Chin has
noted, “drug offenses are subjected to more and harsher collateral consequences than
any other category of crime.”140
And drug offenses are also incredibly broad, covering a huge range of conduct.
For instance, in New York, to “sell” drugs means to “sell, exchange, give or dispose
of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same.” 141 Under federal law, to “distribute”
means to deliver.142 Thus, sharing drugs with a friend makes one guilty of “criminal
sale” in New York and “distribution” under federal law. It also makes one deportable
and subject to a host of other collateral consequences.
Thanks to Padilla and its progeny, the immigration consequences of drug crimes
are particularly well known to criminal lawyers. Padilla made clear that defense
attorneys were responsible for knowing that certain convictions result in

(containing 1274 at the author’s last visit).
137. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)
(2012), gives the general grounds for drug deportability. Essentially, if a noncitizen after
admission is convicted of a violation or conspiracy or attempt to violate a law related to a
controlled substance, he is deportable. Controlled substance is defined under 21 U.S.C. §
802(5)–(6) (2012) as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor,” included in schedule
I, II, III, IV, or V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. These laws essentially mean that
possession-only offenses, including marijuana possession (under thirty grams), are considered
deportable. See Cunnings, supra note 118, at 532.
138. In New York, a conviction for section 221.10, “[c]riminal possession of marihuana in
the fifth degree,” a B misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of three months in jail, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 221.10 (McKinney 2008), makes an individual ineligible for New York City
public housing for three years after completion of the sentence. Collateral Consequences
Calculator—New York State, COLUM. L. SCH., http://calculator.law.columbia.edu
[https://perma.cc/6UNX-8JQQ] (select “221.10 Criminal Possession of Marihuana in the fifth
degree” from the menu on the left). Section 221.10 was the fifth most frequent charge at
arraignments in New York City in 2014 with nearly 25,000 arrests in that year alone. LISA
LINDSAY, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (Justin
Barry ed., 2015), http://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8USP-DC98].
139. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1091
(2015).
140. Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 259 (2002).
141. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(1) (McKinney 2008 & Supp. 2018).
142. 21 U.S.C. § 802(11) (2012).
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deportation.143 Because Padilla involved drug trafficking, the consequences of drug
convictions received particular attention. The case sparked a movement among
defense offices to provide training on immigration consequences 144 but also
highlighted the particularly severe and definite nature of the sanctions that attached
to drug laws. As a result, the legal community has been put on notice. (There is also
some evidence to suggest that in a post-Padilla world, defense attorneys have been
more aware of collateral consequences generally.)145 Defense attorneys report that
“even low-level marijuana charges [are] extremely dangerous for defendants” and so
“defenders will try to find either noncriminal charges for their clients to plead to or
different charges for which they may not have been originally charged.” 146 Because
the noncriminal consequences for drug cases are so profound, defendants have a
tremendous amount to gain from negotiating around drug offenses.
However, drug offenses are some of the trickiest charges to negotiate around and,
therefore, may involve the use of fictional pleas. This is because the very mention of
drugs—either in the statute itself or in the recitation of facts involved in the plea—is
sufficient to trigger a litany of collateral consequences. For this reason, drug cases
must be scrubbed of the fact of the drugs themselves to avoid most collateral
consequences. This is where the fictional plea comes in.
The Padilla case itself makes clear both the trickiness of negotiation in drug cases
and the need for expanded negotiation offers that may indeed involve fictions. As
Part II explained, Justice Stevens encouraged defense attorneys to bargain creatively
to avoid deportation consequences for the client. 147 Embedded in Padilla, then,
seems to be an acceptance that defendants may plea bargain around statutorily
mandated collateral consequences.
But what is a creative plea bargain that avoids deportation in a case such as Padilla?
A brief recitation of the facts is necessary to understand the difficulty posed by trying
to achieve a “creative bargain” in the Padilla case. Jose Padilla, a self-employed
truck-driver, veteran, and longtime legal permanent resident of the United States, had
been driving on Interstate 65 in Kentucky when he stopped at a weigh station. 148
During a search of his truck, an inspector discovered “a substantial quantity of
marijuana.” 149 He was charged with drug trafficking under Kentucky law. Mr.
Padilla said that he had no idea there was marijuana in the shipment, claiming instead
that he believed he was transporting chocolate and abalone between states.150 Despite
these claims of innocence, Mr. Padilla, on the advice of his lawyer, decided to plead
guilty to the charge. 151 Neither he nor his lawyer realized that he would be
mandatorily deportable. 152 Because his lawyer’s advice was wrong, the court

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2010).
Johnson, supra note 3, at 935–40.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 925 (footnote omitted).
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373.
Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359.
Id.
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overturned the conviction and remanded the case back to the original Kentucky trial
court for decision on whether he was prejudiced by such bad advice.153
But, what if Mr. Padilla’s attorney had instead taken Justice Stevens’s advice to
plea bargain “creatively” to avoid deportation? What would the options have been?
As one scholar suggested after the case was decided, there were at least two potential
immigration-safe plea alternatives for Mr. Padilla.154 He could have taken either a
solicitation offense or a misprision felony.155 One could imagine that both crimes, as
felonies, would satisfy the hypothetical sympathetic prosecutor who wants to make
sure there is some criminal penalty imposed on Mr. Padilla, while still being
respectful of Mr. Padilla’s U.S. military service and long residence in the country.
Indeed, it is easy to imagine that in courtrooms across the country, defendants are
opting for pleas to solicitation rather than drug trafficking to avoid collateral
consequences.156
But would either plea be an accurate reflection of the facts underlying the crime?
Solicitation is defined in Kentucky as follows: “A person is guilty of criminal
solicitation when, with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of a
crime, he commands or encourages another person to engage in specific conduct
which would constitute that crime . . . .”157 Misprision is the equivalent of failing to
report a felony. 158 Neither covers the factual allegations in the Padilla case. 159
Therefore, if Mr. Padilla had had an opportunity to plead to either crime before trial,
he would have pleaded guilty to a crime everyone agrees he did not commit. The
facts underlying the initial charge would have had to disappear.
It appears then that, in a case like Padilla, the creative bargains available that also
“reduce the likelihood of deportation” are fictional pleas. Under immigration law,
most drug convictions make a noncitizen deportable or at least increase the likelihood
of becoming deportable.160 As a result, a creative bargain in a drug case that reduces

153. Id. at 387.
154. See Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2653–54
(2013).
155. Id. at 2654 n.15.
156. Some might consider Mr. Padilla’s initial decision to plead guilty to be a sort of
fictional plea since he was accepting guilt for a crime he claims, until today, he did not commit.
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, José Padilla Speaking at University of Denver,
CRIMMIGRATION (Mar. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://crimmigration.com/2016/03/03/jose-padilla
-speaking-at-university-of-denver [https://perma.cc/323M-UZZK]. In fact, statistics indicate
that a small percent of defendants plead guilty, even when they are innocent. See Rakoff, supra
note 20 (“How prevalent is the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty? The few
criminologists who have thus far investigated the phenomenon estimate that the overall rate
for convicted felons as a whole is between 2 percent and 8 percent.”).
157. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.030(1) (LexisNexis 2014).
158. Christopher Mark Curenton, The Past, Present, and Future of 18 U.S.C. § 4: An
Exploration of the Federal Misprision of Felon Statute, 55 ALA. L. REV. 183, 184 (2003).
159. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.1421(1) (LexisNexis 2015) (Trafficking in marijuana:
“A person is guilty of trafficking in marijuana when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in
marijuana.”).
160. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, REPRESENTING NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS:
A NATIONAL GUIDE 33 (2008), https://www.probono.net/library/attachment.132408
[https://perma.cc/8Y23-KRJM] (noting that “Drug Trafficking” is an “aggravated felony”
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the likelihood of deportation is generally one which does not involve a direct
reference to narcotics. If the defendant has only drugs on him, then a defense attorney
and prosecutor seeking a non-deportable plea will likely begin to enter the realm of
fiction.
The cases in the wake of Padilla demonstrate the confusion over the future of
creative bargaining in the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context. There has been
significant debate about how the defendant establishes prejudice where his attorney
gave him incorrect advice. Lower courts have struggled to determine what should
happen in the space between the rejection of the initial plea bargain offer and the
defendant’s election to go to trial.161 In our “system of pleas,”162 the negotiation of
the fictional plea appears to be one of the few viable options to allow defendants to
face serious criminal penalties, while avoiding particular collateral consequences.
The case of Lee v. United States,163 like the Padilla case, is similarly illustrative
of the difficulties of negotiating around a drug charge without removing the drugs
themselves from the plea bargain. In Lee, the Supreme Court decided whether the
defendant—who was not advised that his conviction would result in deportation—
could ever demonstrate prejudice in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. 164
The Court resolved the question in favor of the petitioner, finding that he could have
chosen to forgo a good plea deal, even in the face of terrible trial prospects.165 With
this decision, the Court resolved a circuit split below. 166

under immigration law and that the Department of Homeland Security “may include some
simple possession offenses, such as second or subsequent possession offenses”).
161. In several ineffective assistance of counsel cases at the state and federal level, courts
have referenced the attorney’s work to secure a plea that avoids collateral consequences. See,
e.g., Parrino v. United States, 655 F. App’x 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Here, Plotnik thought
Parrino fit within the ‘permissive’ exclusion provision, and crafted a plea agreement written
to minimize Parrino’s culpability and persuade the Office of the Inspector General at the
Department of Health and Human Services—which administers the exclusion statute—that
Parrino deserved to continue practicing as a pharmacist.”); United States v. Rodriguez-Vega,
797 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A petitioner may demonstrate that there existed a
reasonable probability of negotiating a better plea by identifying cases indicating a willingness
by the government to permit defendants charged with the same or a substantially similar crime
to plead guilty to a non-removable offense.”); Song v. United States, No. CV 09-5184 DOC,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68465, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2011) (“Instead, Mr. Song could
have asked Counsel to do what the Supreme Court urged counsel to do in Padilla: ‘plea bargain
creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the
likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers
the removal consequence.’”); State v. Favela, 311 P.3d 1213, 1219–20 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(“Thus, under this approach, a defendant could demonstrate prejudice by submitting evidence,
for instance, that a different plea could have been negotiated that would have avoided
automatic deportation, even if that plea would have resulted in a conviction of a crime
requiring a longer period of incarceration.”).
162. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
163. 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017).
164. Put another way: “Is it always irrational for a defendant facing strong evidence of
guilt on a deportable offense to exercise his right to go to trial?” Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 12, Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 16-327), 2016 WL 4920945, at *12.
165. See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1958.
166. Prior to Lee, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held that strong evidence of
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The decision—and the arguments made by the parties during litigation of the
case—makes clear that drug cases are ripe territory for fictional pleas. In their briefs,
the parties argued about whether there were alternative pleas available to the
defendant that could have avoided deportation. 167 Available alternatives included,
among others, a plea to a misdemeanor simple possession charge, a non-prosecution
agreement, a pretrial diversion program, or a plea under the Federal First Offender
Act.168 Those options have in common that they carry relatively low-level criminal
penalties. For instance, the misdemeanor carries only up to a year in jail. Both a
pretrial diversion and a non-prosecution agreement would carry no jail time. The
Federal First Offender Act is also a diversion program. 169
Ultimately, the Court in Lee looked only to whether the defendant would have
either accepted the plea on the table or gone to trial. 170 The “plea or trial” dichotomy,
however, ignores the range of alternative pleas that could have been negotiated to
avoid deportation. In setting up this dichotomy, the Court also ignored Justice
Stevens’ suggestion in Padilla that the parties should plea bargain creatively to reach
an immigration-safe resolution.
But what if the prosecutor did want serious criminal sanctions for the defendant
and also an avenue to allow the defendant to remain in the country? The above
options, all of which were suggested as alternatives by Lee’s counsel in his brief
before the Supreme Court, would likely fall short for a prosecutor interested in
pursuing serious criminal charges. One can imagine, however, a fictional plea that
could result in serious sanctions and avoid deportation.
For instance, in many training materials for defense attorneys, public defender
offices or immigration advocates will guide attorneys on how to achieve a nondeportable plea bargain. A handout from the National Association of Criminal
Defense Attorneys encourages attorneys to avoid any drug-related conviction. In a
drug case, this is, of course, an incredibly difficult task. One suggestion the handout
makes is to “[s]pecify a substance that is not covered under 21 U.S.C. 802,” which
designates “controlled substances” for the purposes of federal law. Or in a marijuana
case, they encourage the defender to make sure the record reflects that the “client has
no prior drug convictions” and that she accepts a charge of “possession for personal
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” 171 Another strategy suggested for defense

guilt precluded a finding of prejudice under an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.
Kovacs v. United States, 744 F.3d 44, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Akinsade, 686
F.3d 248, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 724–29 (5th Cir.
2014); Pilla v. United States, 668 F.3d 368, 373 (6th Cir. 2012). The Third, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits found that a defendant could demonstrate prejudice, even in the face of poor
trial prospects. United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643–46 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on
other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013); Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d
at 789–90; Hernandez v. United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1234 (11th Cir. 2015).
167. Brief for Petitioner at *31–32, Lee, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (No. 16-327).
168. Id. at *32.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2012).
170. See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1958.
171. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG OFFENSES:
HANDOUT (2012), https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Legal_Education/Live_CLE
/Live_CLE/03_Drug_Offenses_Handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5PN-X85X].
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attorneys in drugs cases is to plead to an “accessory after-the-fact” charge, which is
not a deportable offense. 172
What becomes clear by looking at Padilla, Lee, and the above advice to attorneys
representing noncitizen defendants in drug cases is that nearly every drug conviction
dooms a defendant to deportation. A step back reveals that drug charges in general
cover a huge range of conduct and carry many substantial collateral consequences
not related to immigration. For that reason, to secure a “safe” plea in a drug case, the
plea must be wiped clean of any drugs. In this context, the fictional plea serves as the
only escape valve—barring a success at trial or a dismissal—for the defendant
sidestepping whatever collateral consequence will be most damaging to him.
3. Sex Offenses
Sex offenses, like drug offenses, generally trigger automatic collateral
consequences. In the case of sex offenses, the same consequence—sex offender
registration—is attached to almost any conviction and affects all defendants who
plead guilty, regardless of their background. And the consequences of sex offender
registration are severe. 173 Sex offenders have their names and addresses posted
publicly to inform communities about those living in their midst who have been
convicted of a registerable offense. 174 They are required to report to state authorities
on a regular basis.175 They are also likely to be subject to housing restrictions, such
as prohibitions on living within a certain distance of a school.176 There are tent cities
full of individuals with sex offense records because of the massive number of

172. DEFENDING IMMIGRANTS P’SHIP, supra note 160, at 110.
173. For an overview of state-by-state requirements for sex offender registration, see Jane
Shim, Listed for Life, SLATE (Aug. 13, 2014, 6:44 AM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/08/sex_offender_registry_laws_by_state_ma
pped.html [https://perma.cc/3NY4-XU9E].
174. See generally Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of
Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1090–94
(2011) (examining the growth in information publicly available about registered sex offenders
and noting that “[a]n offender’s information is globally disseminated through online statemaintained registries, and individuals from any part of the world—whether they may ever be
contemplated future victims or even have contact with the offender—can access a state’s
online registry and the accumulated personal information on it”).
175. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-f (McKinney 2014) (codifying, inter alia, the
requirements for sex offenders to check in with their local law enforcement agency at intervals
dictated by their assessed sex offender level).
176. See Jennifer Burnett, Sex Offender Residency Restriction Zones, COUNCIL ST. GOV’T
(Nov. 19, 2015, 2:42 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/sex-offender-residency
-restriction-zones [https://perma.cc/8TGE-DS8Y] (showing that twenty-seven states
automatically impose housing restrictions for convicted sex offenders by statute, while seven
other states allow government officials, such as judges or parole boards, to set housing
restrictions).
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restrictions on where registered sex offenders can live.177 They often cannot secure
employment.178
Because of these consequences, avoiding sex offender registration is particularly
critical to defendants. Some defendants would rather face significantly more jail time
than end up on a sex offender registry.179 As one public defender in Oakland has
written, “my clients would choose to take more jail time, more fees – anything to
avoid being labeled a sex offender for life.” 180 But sex offenses are also generally
perceived by the public as serious crimes for which there should be significant
punishment. Even where prosecutors may be open to negotiating around the sex
offender requirement, there may be other constraints to such negotiation.
The Introduction to this Article begins with a real story from criminal practice
which demonstrates this point. Although the prosecutor understood that registration
would lead to a serious housing crisis for the defendant, which would only exacerbate
his precarious situation, she also wanted to make sure that the defendant faced a
meaningful consequence for the crime. But given that almost all sex offenses were
classified as registrable offenses by statute, the prosecutor and defense attorney
started to experiment with fictions—how could they achieve a conviction with
serious sanctions, but without the registration? They contemplated an assault charge,
but it would require that they state on the record that the victim had suffered “bodily
injury.” That suggestion was too great a “fiction” for the prosecutor.
They ultimately landed on the idea of three separate misdemeanor convictions—
a different type of fiction—since the defendant committed only a single instance of
sex abuse. The convictions would require three instances of conduct that met the
elements of the statute. As Section I.C.1 made clear, misdemeanors generally require
fewer procedural hoops, including the need to state the facts supporting a plea
bargain on the record. Although the judge could reject the plea, he or she could also
choose to go along with it, knowing that there would be no evidence of the fiction on
the formal record. Indeed, this is what occurred. The defendant pleaded guilty to
three misdemeanor charges, which each carried a year in prison but no sex offender
registration.
There is evidence that the practice of using fictional pleas to avoid sex offender
registration is common. In Ohio, for instance, the debate over “baseless pleas” has
focused on the use of such pleas to help defendants circumvent registration. Ohio
Supreme Court Justice Michael P. Donnelly, formerly a judge of the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court, has argued for a local state rule that would require a
recitation of the facts underlying any plea that is accepted by the court. In support of

177. Douglas Hanks, Tent Camp of Homeless Sex Offenders near Hialeah ‘Has Got To
Close,’ County Says, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 22, 2017, 6:48 AM), http://www.miamiherald
.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article168569977.html
[https://perma.cc/34TE
-KXVR].
178. See id.
179. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 922 (“[O]ne public defender described an example in
which the defendant opted for fifteen months in jail—a much longer prison sentence than usual
for the type of the case—to avoid sex offender registration.”).
180. Rachel Marshall, I’m a Public Defender. My Clients Would Rather Go to Jail than
Register as Sex Offenders, VOX (July 5, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016
/7/5/12059448/sex-offender-registry [https://perma.cc/B5HZ-499Y].
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his proposal, he cites 400 felony charges from 2008 to 2014 that were charged
originally as sex crimes and, through the use of plea bargaining, reduced to non-sexcrime offenses.181 He noted that the most common reduced charges were abduction,
felonious assault, or child endangerment. 182 Interestingly, all of these are serious
crimes with the potential for hefty sentences, 183 but they do not require sex offender
registration. One can imagine that these charges would provide a space for an
agreement that satisfied the needs of the prosecutor—to hold the defendant
accountable—and the needs of the defendant—to avoid sex offender registration. But
such a meeting of the minds might also require, as the critics of this practice note, a
resort to fiction.
II. FICTIONAL PLEAS: A CASE STUDY IN THE DECLINE OF TRUTH
Thus far, this Article has given an overview of the practice of fictional plea
bargaining: Who uses such bargains and to what end? In which types of cases will
fictional pleas be used to greatest effect? In this description, one sees the many
benefits of the fictional plea to practitioners on the ground. These benefits are felt
immediately in individual cases. A defendant may avoid being ripped from his family
and the country he calls home. A prosecutor may get to use her discretion to make
sure that a defendant gets help for substance abuse but does not end up on a lifetime
sex offender registry, which will ultimately, in her view, harm the defendant and
society more than keeping him off the list and seeking alternative forms of
punishment. Or, a judge takes a stand, albeit quietly, against the federal government’s
immigration priorities. The fictional plea, in many cases, serves a clear purpose and
is the result of the good intentions of the actors involved.
There are, of course, questions about the ethical lines crossed by lawyers and
judges when they participate (knowingly) in these fictions. The Rules of Professional
Responsibility require a duty of candor for lawyers before the tribunal. 184 There are
clear arguments that when lawyers enter a plea bargain on the record based on
fictions, they are in conflict with these rules. 185 But, as many scholars have

181. See supra note 81.
182. Dissell, supra note 81.
183. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(D)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp.
2018) (stating that felonious assault is either a first or second degree felony, depending on the
specific conduct); id. § 2905.02(C) (stating that the crime of abduction is second or third
degree felony, depending on the specific conduct); id. § 2919.22(E)(2)(b)–(d) (stating that
child endangerment is a felony in the fourth, third, or second degree, depending on the specific
conduct); id. § 2929.14(A)(1)–(5) (defining the definite prison sentence ranges for felony
offenses).
184. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (“A lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”); id. r. 3.4(b)
(“[A] lawyer shall not falsify evidence [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely.”).
185. Mari Byrne has argued specifically about why fictional pleas violate the ethical rules
that bind lawyers. Byrne, supra note 14, at 2966–67. But other scholars have persuasively
argued that lawyers should have a deeper commitment to truth than what a formalist reading
of the ethical rules requires. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and
Subjective Perspectives on Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 105, 111, 148
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persuasively argued, lawyers are not bound by a duty to total truth. 186 Judges have
their own set of ethical rules, which also require them to act in accordance with the
law and promote confidence in the judiciary. 187
Leaving aside debates about judicial and attorney ethics, this Article instead
focuses on how fictional pleas serve as a case study in criminal justice problem
solving and how little truth matters to the current problem-solving scheme. What
does it mean that all parties in the criminal justice system agree to allow a lie to
become fact? What does the fictional plea tell us about the role of truth in our modern
adversarial structure? Faced with the moral quandary of mandatory collateral
consequences, the system adjusts by discarding truth and focuses solely on resolution.
The fictional plea lays bare the soul of an institution where everything has become a
bargaining chip: not merely collateral consequences, but truth itself. Rather than a
grounding principle, truth is nothing more than another factor to negotiate around.
A. Truth Seeking vs. Problem-Solving
At the outset, it is important to make three things clear, each of which will be
developed more below. The first is that this Article presupposes that truth is a
normative goal of the adversarial model of criminal justice. The second is that this
Article does not purport to define truth, but nor does it abandon the premise that some
version of the truth is knowable. The third is that discarding fictional pleas will not
solve any particular problem with the criminal justice system; it will not restore truth
to some mythical rightful place. For this reason, the critique offered here is meant to
serve as a case study in the role of truth in the system, not as a prescription to remedy
an ill.
Truth is not, of course, an easily defined concept. There is a rich literature about
the nature of truth in the adversarial system, which demonstrates the depth of the
inquiry.188 Even given these debates about truth, this Article rejects the notion that

(2016) (“The ability of a judge, or a legal system, to face social conflict in an honest way
depends on the facts of the dispute being presented to decision-makers in a fundamentally
honest way. That does not mean lawyers should aim directly at the truth, but it does mean
there are reasons to disfavor the traditional, unmodified version of the standard conception, in
which the value of truthfulness does not serve as a constraint on advocacy (beyond the rules
prohibiting the use of false evidence).”).
186. See, e.g., STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T,
CAN’T, AND SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH (2001); W. BRADLEY WENDEL,
ETHICS AND LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 121–25 (2014) (ebook) (discussing scholarship by
Deborah Rhode and William Simon that have used as an example a lawyer advising a client
to tell a small lie in order to keep her public benefits; the permissibility of this advice lies in
the unfairness of the public benefits scheme itself); Albert W. Alshuler, Lawyers and TruthTelling, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189 (2003) (discussing debates among scholars about the
obligations for attorneys to be honest); David Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity
(When They Aren’t Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 815 (2005) (arguing that lawyers
should serve as an instrument to share their clients’ stories, even where those stories may
involve deception).
187. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
188. For just a small sample, see Alshuler, supra note 186 (discussing the scholarly
responses to the adversarial system’s relationship to truth telling); Stephanos Bibas, Designing
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truth is undefinable.189 Facts tell us the truth or at least something approximating it
in any particular case.190 For our purposes, it is enough to say that the discovery of
truth (or something close to it) is possible in many criminal cases via the collection
of facts.
Nor is truth synonymous with justice, but it is not surprising that they are often
paired together as twin concepts “since establishing the truth is . . . a precursor to
determining just[ice].”191 But fictional pleas exist because justice does not always
require truth or, rather, actors within the criminal system perceive that they can
achieve justice without truth. And yet, truth is certainly one of the purported goals of
the adversarial system. Wigmore’s famous line that cross-examination, the heart of
the adversarial model, is “beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth”192 has been repeated so often that most lawyers accept it
as gospel. The American model of criminal adjudication—including plea
bargaining—has been imported around the globe on the strength of the argument that
it is more transparent and fair than the systems previously in place in many countries
and that this, in turn, leads to more truthful outcomes.193
Furthermore, although the criminal justice system has always had a tolerance for
legal fictions,194 the fact that the federal system and most states require some factual
basis for a plea bargain indicates a normative commitment to recording some version
of truth.195 For instance, in his dissent in Libretti v. United States, Justice Stevens

Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and Fairness Without Trials as Backstops,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055 (2016) (discussing the challenges to accuracy in the adversarial
system); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (1975) (“My theme . . . is that our adversary system rates truth too low among the
values that institutions of justice are meant to serve” and that lawyers have a responsibility for
truth telling.); Kenneth S. Klein, Truth and Legitimacy (in Courts), 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1
(2016) (comparing the meaning of truth within the legal system to the public perception of the
role of truth in courts).
189. See Wendel, supra note 185.
190. Cf. Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1220 (2004)
(pushing back against the concept of evidence law as being primarily about truth seeking, but
noting that “[m]ost analyses of evidence law take litigation’s prime object to be the discovery
of truth about past events”).
191. Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular Legitimacy?: The
Role of Establishing the Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77
ALB. L. REV. 1095, 1095, 1108–11 (2013) (discussing the ways in which truth and justice are
not necessarily synonymous in studies about the popular legitimacy of the court system).
192. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1974).
193. See, e.g., Thea Johnson, Latin Justice: A New Look, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2013, at
57–64 (discussing the transition in Latin American countries from an inquisitorial to an
adversarial model of justice that is based on the American system).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 226–27.
195. This normative value is also repeated and embraced by scholars. See, e.g., Bibas,
supra note 188, at 1061 (“The core goals of criminal procedural system should be accuracy
and fairness. The investigatory, bargaining, and advising processes should be (re)designed to
ensure the factual, legal, and moral accuracy of the resulting convictions, sentences, and
collateral consequences.”).
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made clear that Rule 11 is the procedural vehicle by which judges determine the truth
of the matter, which is required for enforcing the substantive law. 196 As Justice
Stevens wrote, a court must “satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for any
judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea . . . . Were a court to do otherwise, it would
permit the parties to define the limits of its power.” 197 In the same decision, Justice
Stevens rejects the idea that a wealthy defendant may be able to “forfeit” property
that the government has no statutory right to simply to gain a “favorable sentence.”198
It is truth that, in theory, prevents that scenario from playing out.
It is interesting, then, that it was Justice Stevens who embraced the problemsolving tool of creative bargaining in the Padilla case fifteen years later. Although
the creative bargain in Padilla implicates different concerns than that in Libretti, as
Section I.C.2 makes clear, there was simply no truth-based plea that would have
allowed Mr. Padilla to escape deportation and be punished for drug running in the
criminal justice system. In the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has caught up
somewhat to the reality of the criminal system. As Justice Kennedy noted in Missouri
v. Frye, after a lengthy discussion of the pervasiveness of plea bargaining, “To note
the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it.”199 Padilla, Frye, and Frye’s
companion case, Lafler v. Cooper, 200 all acknowledge that plea bargaining as a
problem-solving tool is critical to the functioning of the modern adversarial system.
But the current system of plea bargaining has become separated from the
purported principles of adversarialism. 201 Rather than truth seeking, the system is
obsessively focused on efficiency. 202 Indeed, the modern adversarial model has
allowed efficient problem solving to subsume the broader normative goals of the
system. As Christopher Slobogin argues, plea bargaining itself is incompatible with
the purported premises of the adversarial system, including procedure based on open
confrontation.203 Such confrontation has traditionally been viewed as a means for
discovering truth. The wholesale embrace of plea bargaining, then, goes along with
an abandonment of some of the fundamental values that undergird the criminal
system, including truth seeking. Without an anchor of truth, the only guiding
principle is efficiency—getting the case resolved quickly and (ideally) with some
gains for both sides.

196. 516 U.S. 29, 56 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 55.
199. 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012).
200. 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
201. Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of
Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to Preventive Justice and HybridInquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505 (2016).
202. See Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 421, 431–47 (2014) (discussing the main barriers to accuracy in criminal law); see also
Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 911, 912 (2011/2012) (“The current American system is marked by an adversary
process so compromised by imbalance between the parties—in terms of resources and access
to evidence—that true adversary testing is virtually impossible.”).
203. Slobogin, supra note 201, at 1507–09.
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The efficient plea bargaining trade-offs tend to be well-known.204 The prosecutor
agrees to relative leniency in sentencing or charging for a promise from the defendant
that he will plead guilty and save the prosecutor’s office resources. But as Section
I.B outlines, these trade-offs may include much outside the sentence and charge.205
This makes sense if the system is structured to purely resolve cases rather than seek
truth. As Ken Strutin has noted, “Pretrial innocence and guilt are legal commodities,
situational legal truths.”206 They become—along with the charge, the sentence, the
potential collateral consequences, and, even, the truth—bargaining chips to be traded
in search of a solution.207
And despite the fact that factual basis requirements indicate a normative
commitment to truth, as a practical matter they tend not to stop fictional pleas from
entering the formal record. Because the agreements of the parties are generally
accepted by rote, “the findings of fact that emerge from plea bargaining are not
subject to any meaningful testing.” 208 Even where the judge requests a factual basis,
“this requirement can be satisfied merely by asking the parties in charge of evidence
production—the prosecutor and the defense attorney—if such a basis exists.”209 As
a result, a lie—particularly a well-intentioned lie—becomes easier to present to the
court.
It may be appropriate, then, to characterize fictional pleas as, what Julia SimonKerr has termed, “systemic lying,” in which multiple actors in the criminal system
allow a lie to continue.210 Such lying may occur where stakeholders perceive that the
lie is warranted or excused in the face of some other, greater, cause. Simon-Kerr
explores a number of examples of the phenomena, including the “testilying” of police
officers on the witness stand,211 the use of “pious perjury” in the early nineteenth
century to avoid capital punishment for minor crimes, and the tendency of juries to
nullify in trials in the post-Reconstruction South.212
But as Simon-Kerr points out, resolving such conflict through lying poses grave
risks to the rule of law: “[I]t is not a positive condition for the legal system such that
we should welcome it when it appears and rationalize it as an efficient de facto

204. Thea Johnson, Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining, AM. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming
2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
205. See supra Section I.B.2.
206. Ken Strutin, Truth, Justice and the American Style Plea Bargain, 77 ALB. L. REV. 825,
833 (2013/2014).
207. See Slobogin, supra note 201, at 1516 (“[V]ery few defendants ever exercise their
rights to remain silent, testify, confront accusers, or be heard by a jury during a public trial.
Rather, these rights are merely bargaining chips to be used in negotiations with the prosecutor,
and are relinquished on a routine basis.”).
208. Id. at 1518.
209. Id. (footnote omitted).
210. Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 2179.
211. See generally id. at 2202–08, 2185–89, 2195–202 (discussing “testilying,” as well as
other examples of the “systemic lying,” such as “pious perjury” in the early nineteenth century
to avoid capital punishment for minor crimes and the tendency of juries to nullify in trials in
the post-Reconstruction South); Morgan Cloud, Judges, “Testilying,” and the Constitution,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1350–57 (1996) (discussing those cases in which “testilying” arises
most frequently).
212. Simon-Kerr, supra note 12, at 2220.
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solution to certain moral-formal dilemmas.”213 Fictional pleas have become a “de
facto solution” for a group of criminal justice actors confronted with vulnerable
defendants facing serious collateral consequences.
But the reason that the fictional plea emerges as a solution to such a problem is
that the modern system of plea bargaining values problem solving over truth seeking.
These well-meaning actors, when confronted by what they perceive as the injustices
of mandatory collateral consequences have, largely, not sought to lobby federal and
state legislatures to undo the law but have rather added collateral consequences to
the pot of chips to be bargained for during plea negotiations. This response is possible
because truth is not a guidepost for the resolution of criminal cases.
1. Fictions as a Prosecutorial Tool
The descriptive portion of this Article paints a portrait of a “new” district attorney,
committed in certain cases—particularly cases that implicate immigration issues—
to helping defendants avoid severe collateral consequences, while still holding those
same defendants accountable within the criminal system. This appears to be an
empathetic vision of prosecutorial discretion, and again, in any individual case it very
well may be a form of compassionate prosecution.
But if everything is a bargaining chip, the party that benefits is the one with the
most power to negotiate. In the criminal system, that is the prosecutor. As a systemic
issue, fictional pleas function as an additional tool that increases the power of the
prosecutors and may be readily used to further punish defendants. Both courts and
scholars alike have written about the coercive nature of plea bargaining as a practice
(separate and apart from fictional pleas).214 Despite evidence that judges are taking a
more active role in plea bargaining,215 the modern adversarial criminal process is run
by the parties, particularly by prosecutors.216 Collateral consequences, although of a
different variety, have now become additional bargaining chips. Although they can
be used to lessen the criminal penalty, they can also be a powerful strategic tool for
prosecutors to use against defendants.217
Progressive prosecutors who want to protest the mandatory imposition of serious
collateral consequences have other options beyond the fictional plea. In examining
these roads not taken, one sees again that the fictional plea––as a systemic matter––
does not serve the interests of defendants in the long run, even if in any individual
case there are defendants who benefit substantially from its use. One alternative
option for prosecutors is to decline to charge cases in which they believe the
imposition of collateral consequences would work against the interests of justice. It

213. Id.
214. See e.g., Mezzanatto v. United States, 513 U.S. 196, 209–10 (1995) (“The plea
bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a
series of fundamental rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government ‘may encourage
a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.’” (quoting Corbitt v. New
Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)).
215. See supra Section I.B.3.
216. Slobogin, supra note 201, at 1516.
217. See Crane, supra note 96, at 802–03; Jain, supra note 98, at 1222.
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is well within the discretion of prosecutors to decline prosecution. 218 And such an
action would serve as an expressive use of their discretion: an open rejection of the
legislative decisions of both the state and federal governments219 to impose collateral
consequences in the first place. A prosecutor might respond to this alternative by
noting that dismissing the charges serves only to benefit the defendant and eliminates
the other side of the bargain––that the prosecutor gets to hold the defendant
accountable. But such a defense is grounded in the idea that justice in the criminal
system is manifested not by taking a stand against injustice but by negotiating around
the perceived injustice.220
Prosecutors could also join lobbying efforts to reform the system of collateral
consequences. Prosecutors’ offices frequently lobby on criminal justice issues. 221
Prosecutor associations take formal positions on matters ranging from discovery laws
to gun laws to reforms to the jury system.222 In Ohio, prosecutors lobbied against the
adoption of a rule that would require the parties to enter a factual basis for the plea
on the record.223 These positions can and often are adopted by the legislative bodies
charged with making decisions on criminal justice reform issues. A collective call
from prosecutors to do away with the imposition of mandatory collateral
consequences would very likely make some headway. And yet, such a call has been
absent––even as prosecutors have publicly decried the results of mandatory collateral
consequences. There simply is not an institutional force to push prosecutors in this
direction.224 The system, rather, has settled into a particular routine to resolve issues

218. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252–54
(2011).
219. There would, of course, be differences between a protest against local government
versus the federal government. As Section I.B.2 makes clear, prosecutors feel more
comfortable speaking out openly against the imposition of immigration consequences on
criminal defendants. This is likely for two reasons: first, the Supreme Court in Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), has acknowledged the seriousness of immigration
consequences and second, it may be easier for the prosecutor to take a stand against the federal
government than the state government for which the prosecutor theoretically works.
220. In certain states, judges too have the power to dismiss cases. As Anna Roberts argues,
judges may use this power to push back on injustices in the system, including by dismissing
cases where the judge views the potential collateral consequences as excessive. Anna Roberts,
Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327 (2017).
221. Josie Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just Enforcing the Law—They’re Making It,
APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-they
-re-making-it-d83e6e59f97a [https://perma.cc/7LKW-QJBT].
222. See Katie Shepherd, Oregon District Attorneys Drop Plan To Scrap Non-Unanimous
Jury Verdicts, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Jan. 30, 2018), http://www.wweek.com/news
/courts/2018/01/30/oregon-district-attorneys-drop-plan-to-scrap-non-unanimous-jury
-verdicts/?utm_source=In+Justice+Today+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9a097419e8-&utm
_medium=email&utm_term=0_0331e33901-9a097419e8-53259263
[https://perma.cc/8CWN-3UW2].
223. Dissell, supra note 81.
224. Partly, this may be explained by what David Sklansky has described as the “ambiguity
of the prosecutor’s role,” namely that prosecutors “face conflicting expectations” that ask them
to be “leaders of law enforcement” and “agents of mercy and discretion.” David Alan Sklansky,
The Problems with Prosecutors, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY, 2018, at 451, 461; see also David
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of perceived injustice and this routine embraces the “systemic lying” identified by
Simon-Kerr over a more formalized fight against the injustice itself.
B. Present Fictions as Future Truth
One of the most concerning features of the fictional plea is that it creates a record
that then becomes “truth.” Fictional pleas are not legal fictions, a commonly used
device in the legal system.225 The legal system has always tolerated and endorsed
legal fictions. They serve as “an enabler,” allowing the “application of the law to
novel legal questions and circumstances.” 226 Formal legal fictions require “a
suspension of belief because [they are] not meant to deceive”227 but rather assist.
When we say that a corporation is a person, we know that a corporation does not
breath air, but we accept such a fiction for the limited purposes of establishing the
rights and responsibilities of the corporation.228 In criminal law, there are a number
of fictions that sustain the system. For instance, guilty defendants, who fully intend
to plead guilty, enter formal pleas of “not guilty” to keep the case moving forward.229
But fictional pleas are “meant to deceive.” Unlike legal fictions, which are
understood to be fictions not just by the parties to the individual transaction but also
by anyone who views them from the outside, a fictional plea, even when done with
a wink and a nod among the parties, results, as with all pleas, in a record of criminal
conviction. After the defendant accepts a guilty plea––whether fictional or not––he
carries with him a conviction which has real-world outcomes. 230 The conviction
follows him. It may, for instance, prevent him from voting. 231 That consequence
occurs because the conviction stands as proof that the defendant committed a crime
and accepted guilt for that crime.232 Even if the parties knew about the fiction, no one

Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 3 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2016).
225. I focus here on the difference between fictional pleas and legal fictions because
attorneys and judges tend to use the “legal fiction” phrase to describe the fictional plea. See,
e.g., Interview with Justice Michael Donnelly, supra note 103.
226. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 70, 79
(2010).
227. Id. at 119 (citing LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1984)).
228. For additional examples of common legal fictions, see generally id. at 1–5 (noting the
myriad legal fictions used in property law, family law, tax law, and elsewhere).
229. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “How Do You Plead, Guilty or Not Guilty?”: Does the Plea
Inquiry Violate the Defendant’s Right to Silence?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1409, 1411–12 (2005)
(“What is for lawyers and judges a casually used term-of-art is viewed by ordinary people as
a serious moral claim by the defendant that he did not commit the crime. In order to make the
state prove its case, the defendant must make a false statement[, i.e., not guilty].”).
230. See generally Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the
Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789 (2012).
231. Voting with a Criminal Record—Executive Summary, ACLU, https://www
.aclu.org/other/voting-criminal-record-executive-summary [https://perma.cc/SM7L-T674].
232. Although as Brandon Garrett has argued, we should not view plea bargains as
confessions in the first place, they are not taken under oath and are not supported by a factual
record—precisely what allows them to be manipulated as they are in the context of fictional
pleas. Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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else does. The public, federal immigration authorities, or local state agencies that
impose penalties on individuals convicted of certain crimes are all in the dark about
the facts underlying the conviction. It does not make sense, then, to think of fictional
pleas as legal fictions, either by operation or result.233
A fictional plea becomes a permanent record of a conviction. But there is no mark
on an individual’s criminal record to indicate that a particular plea represented the
facts or did not. The plea formally represents a confession to a charge, which is
translated to a conviction and then to a criminal record. 234 And in this sense, the
fiction is transformed into truth. A fictional plea tells a false narrative about what
crime the defendant committed and for which he accepted guilt. The fictional plea
therefore does not simply enable the “application of the law to novel circumstances,”
but produces a record which is used in all future cases involving this particular
defendant. The “downstream actors”235—whether a future judge, district attorney, or
probation officer, reviewing the rap sheet of a defendant—will not ask themselves if
the conviction was or was not the result of a particular type of bargain, but will accept
the conviction as fact.
At the moment the plea bargain is entered, this may not seem problematic, but on
both an individual level and systemic level, it is a cause for concern. On the
individual level, the defendant is creating a record of behavior that is not accurate.
Returning to the example from the Introduction, the defendant is admitting to three
acts of sex abuse, rather than one. Although the three acts are categorized as
misdemeanors and therefore less “serious” crimes, to the outside world they indicate
a pattern of abusive behavior, where one may not actually exist. It is not hard to
imagine a future prosecutor in a potential future criminal case pointing to the
defendant’s criminal record and harping on the defendant’s repeat crimes. Similarly,
the defendant who claims he inhaled toxic vapors rather than smoked marijuana has
created a record of what may be seen as potentially “worse” behavior than what he
was actually charged with. Marijuana is now legal across many states, which is a
good indication that the social approbation associated with use of the drug has
weakened. Not so with “huffing,” which is essentially what the defendant pleaded to.

1415 (2016).
233. Some scholars have argued that the traditional line between acceptable and
nonacceptable legal fictions appears to lie at “the ultimate question of culpability,” meaning
that traditionally, the system objects to an innocent man pleading guilty to a crime he did not
commit, but not necessarily to a guilty man pleading to a crime he did not commit, rather than
the crime he did commit. Culpability differentiates the two men. See Bowers, supra note 17,
at 1122, 1171 (arguing, though, that the line should move to include culpability within the
definition of legal fiction so that “false pleas” by the innocent man who chooses to plead guilty
may be considered as a formal legal fiction). But drawing the line at culpability ignores that
fictional pleas have a purposely deceiving effect. In the context of collateral consequences,
particularly, the deception is what provides the defendant protection and is the entire point of
the exercise. Fictional pleas, therefore, fall outside the scope of classic legal fiction.
234. As Brandon Garrett notes, we should not think of plea bargains as confessions because,
as noted throughout this Article, they are often not supported by a factual record. As Garrett
notes, the lack of adjudicated fact becomes a problem precisely because such convictions are
used for determining collateral consequences. Garrett, supra note 232, at 1437–38.
235. See Michael P. Donnelly, End Factually Baseless Plea Bargains, 42 LITIG., no. 3,
2016, at 6.
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The immediate benefits in each case were clear and important, but in both cases the
plea has created a record of behavior that may have unintended consequences down
the road.
There are other ways the defendant may be hurt by his false record. As Eisha Jain
notes, once an individual is “marked” with a criminal conviction, criminal justice
agencies and even organizations outside of the criminal system use the “mark” to
make a number of determinations about the individual. 236 For instance, probation
reports at both the state and federal level are often based on the defendant’s criminal
record. These reports generate recommendations about sentencing and rehabilitation.
In federal courts, each additional crime on the defendant’s record has the potential to
generate points, which drive up his sentencing guidelines range. Of course, the
defendant was already facing a criminal charge, even before the fictional plea, but
fictional pleas (and other forms of creative bargaining) often result in the defendant
accepting a more serious charge. 237 That more serious charge may avoid certain
consequences at the moment but can easily lead to additional consequences down the
road.
There are also less obvious examples of the negative consequences of fictional
pleas. For instance, impeachment by prior criminal conviction is a common tactic
that lawyers use during trials. Such impeachment impacts the decisions of defendants
and other witnesses to take the stand and, in turn, weakens the voice of those with
criminal records, even where the record may not reflect truth.238 Again, there is no
way to explain the nature of the plea after the fact. 239 As a result, a plea to a more
serious charge or a charge that simply does not reflect the individual’s conduct may
discourage that individual from testifying in his own defense or acting as a witness
in future cases. False narratives about prior cases have a way of weaving themselves
into the narrative of future cases through these evidence rules.
Beyond the individual level, fictional pleas can have a systemic impact on the
criminal justice system. We are in a moment where scholars, practitioners, and
politicians are focused on data collection as a way of studying the criminal system. 240
Fictional pleas skew the data, telling false stories not only about individual
defendants but about patterns and trends more generally. The study of these trends
has an impact on a range of issues, including funding for criminal justice initiatives
or institutions. Fictional pleas may give accurate information about what sorts of

236. Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1402–17 (2018).
237. See Johnson, supra note 204.
238. See Roberts, supra note 18, at 1993–94; Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152, 208–11 (2017).
239. Anna Roberts has proposed that given the unreliability of convictions, before a
conviction can be used for impeachment purposes, there should be a hearing to determine
whether it serves as a reliable indicator of the individual’s guilt for the crime of conviction.
Anna Roberts, Impeachment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 592–94 (2014).
Such a hearing would be particularly useful in the case of fictional pleas.
240. See, e.g., Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies, How Do We “Do Data” in Public Defense?,
78 ALB. L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2014/2015); Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The
Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 335–
36 (2015); Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
1057 (2015).
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cases are disposed of in criminal court, but they slant the data about what sorts of
crimes are being committed and by whom. Indeed, in reviewing cases from Ohio that
had entered the criminal justice system as registrable sex offenses but exited the
system as non-registrable, non-sex offenses, one sees the ways in which the fictional
plea masks the number and types of sex crimes occurring within a jurisdiction. 241
(Although true statistics may be masked anyway by other factors, such as policing
trends in the jurisdiction.)
The fictional plea solves an immediate need for the defendant that justifies the use
of the underlying fiction to the parties. But these fictions become future truths that
shape the individual defendant’s experience going forward and also the way the
system responds to defendants, individually and collectively.
CONCLUSION
This study of fictional pleas should force us to examine our system of collateral
consequences and the nature of the criminal system more broadly. Fictional pleas
demonstrate both the distorting impact that mandatory collateral consequences have
on the criminal system, but also the slipperiness of the criminal system itself, which
although seemingly bound by formal rules and procedures, finds a way to solve
problems that are well outside those boundaries. By putting in place so many serious
consequences that must be imposed even for relatively low-level criminal behavior,
legislatures have created a web of overlapping concerns for criminal defendants. To
untangle them from the web, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges are willing
to engage in “systemic lying.”
Fictional pleas expose the extreme lengths that stakeholders are willing to go to
respond to the expanding scope of noncriminal sanctions that are implicated by the
criminal system. We have a system that involves judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys conspiring to assist defendants in avoiding the terrible fates that have been
imposed upon them by legislatures. It should give lawmakers pause that their
collateral consequences policies have created this morass within the criminal system.
But it should give the actors within the system pause as well that their proposed
solution to this problem has not been to lobby for change, refuse to move forward on
cases where injustice would manifest, or otherwise protest against the mandatory
imposition of collateral consequences. Rather, the solution has been plea bargaining.
Such an obsessive focus on “getting to plea bargain” 242 has profound consequences
for the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

241. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
242. This serves as a play on the famous negotiation primer, Getting to Yes. ROGER FISHER
& WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce
Patton ed., Penguin Books 2011) (1981) (ebook).

